ANALYSIS: Resolution to GCC Rift Looks Premature
Qatar broke with several of its GCC allies in 2017. (Wikimedia Commons)
Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker signaled progress in the longstanding Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rift with Qatar on September 9 at the Brookings Institute. Since then, there have been increasing rumors in the Middle East about a resolution to the three-year split within the GCC, which has seen Qatar blackballed by its Arab neighbors. However, experts say core disagreements persist, and the face-saving exit that both sides require has no genuine momentum. The biggest hurdle, Abu Dhabi’s continued rejection of compromise without Doha’s submission to the original demands, remains unresolved. Speculation surrounds the Trump administration’s efforts to end the dispute in the hopes of tightening regional isolation of Iran.
Three GCC members—Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain—and Egypt severed relations with Qatar in June, 2017. They embargoed land, air and sea contact as well as ejecting Qatari nationals from residence. The boycott alleged Doha’s support for extremist groups, mentioning specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political movement, and it demanded the emirate take various steps—from downgrading relations with Iran to shuttering the Doha-funded broadcaster Al Jazeera. Qatar denied it supports any terror organization, pointing to Kuwait’s relations with Iran as well as its contribution to regional security via the Al Udeid base that hosts the U.S. Air Force. Doha restored full diplomatic relations with Tehran only after the boycott started; it had previously downgraded them along with the rest of the GCC after the 2016 attack on the Saudi mission in Tehran.
Several factors have revived Washington’s push on the issue. Last month’s Abraham Accords normalizing relations between Israel, UAE and Bahrain were in part driven by a common threat from Iran that fit into the United States’ “maximum pressure campaign.” Some analysts claim the U.S. is rushing to back up that policy accomplishment with a second win for its Iran containment. Secretary Mike Pompeo summarized, “To close the door to increased Iranian meddling, it's past time to find a solution to the Gulf rift.”
Hopeful observers believe that there are signs of softening within the Gulf. In August, the GCC requested an extension of the UN Security Council’s arms embargo against Iran, a move some interpret to mean that Qatar is joining its partners in recognizing the need for security and unity a year after the Iranian attacks against the Abqaiq oil complex and a UAE-registered tanker. A recent decision regarding airspace by the International Court of Justice in favor of Qatar also offers a compromise.
Gerd Nonneman, professor of International Relations and Gulf Studies at Georgetown University Doha, is less sanguine. He said in an interview with the Caravel, “It is true Saudi Arabia might find it tempting to find a face-saving means to de-escalate the crisis, if only to lessen pressure from the U.S. and global public opinion. But Mohammed bin Salman by all accounts seems unwilling to move without Abu Dhabi, and all indications from the latter are that they are not ready for any compromise.” Even the UN arms embargo extension may not signal any distancing of Qatar from Iran; experts call it a common GCC tactic to have the organization announce positions without any bilateral commitment.
At this stage, says Nonneman, ambiguous optimism like Schenker’s is likely “in part psychological pressure, trying to elicit movement by suggesting it was possible.” At most, it could reflect “willingness in Riyadh and Manama, as well as Cairo, to have non-binding discussions about possible scenarios for relieving some of the boycott, even if informally.”
It is doubtful that the GCC dispute will resolve itself just on the power of the Trump administration’s race against time. U.S. leverage against either side ultimately seems quite limited. Riyadh won’t compromise substantively unless Abu Dhabi joins it, and that change of heart seems as unlikely today as in mid-2017. So, Qatar, which has skirted the worst effects of the embargo due to Iranian support and has managed to defend its value to regional security in Washington, has no obvious incentive to cave or even meet its rivals halfway.