Felipe Lobo Koerich (SFS ‘21, LAS ‘22) is the Caravel’s Publisher and a guest writer for the Caravel's opinion section. The content and opinions of this piece are the writer’s and the writer’s alone. They do not reflect the opinions of the Caravel or its staff.

The Casa Rosada, the presidential residence and offices, serves as a symbol of the power and authority of the presidency. (Wikimedia)

Delegative democracy, a diminished subtype of democracy skewed towards presidential power and supremacy over the political system, plagues many Latin American countries—in particular, Argentina. These democracies allow presidents to rule with far too little oversight from Congress and to wield powers greatly exceeding those that any representative government should allow their leader. Semi-presidential systems, however, offer a viable alternative.

What is a semi-presidential system?

Semi-presidential systems separate the head of state and the head of government. Argentina considered this system in the 1980s; the president, directly elected by the people, would appoint a prime minister (PM) from the majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the PM’s selected cabinet ministers (1). The PM would oversee national policy, while the president would nominate judges and ambassadors, manage the military, and call for new elections in times of crisis (2). By splitting powers between the PM and the president, a semi-presidential system would help Argentina resolve the issues presented by delegative democracy.

What’s so bad about delegative democracy?

Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell defines a delegative democracy system as a stable form of democracy in which the president, by virtue of democratic election, can “govern as he or she sees fit.” The citizenry, and much of political society, view presidents as saviors and allow them to govern mainly by decree even as they ignore governmental institutions and ‘do what must be done.’

O’Donnell lists many of the dangers of such a system. Delegative democracy prioritizes the short-term, undermines institutions, curtails horizontal accountability, increases electoral stakes, and results in less legitimacy, poor policymaking, and political and economic instability.

Oh my, is that happening in Argentina?

Argentina certainly fits the mold. As described by O’Donnell, its current democracy began amidst severe socioeconomic and political crises created by the former dictatorial regime. Its first presidents frequently governed by decree, ignoring or altering institutions that interfered with their policies and creating significant instability in the process. Former Argentine President Carlos Menem stacked the Supreme Court with loyalists, and the country famously had five presidents in 10 days during the 2000-2001 crises.

Alberto Fernández and Cristina Fernández Kirchner were sworn in to the presidency and vice-presidency of Argentina on December 10, 2019. (Wikimedia Commons)

The Kirchner era fits with this pattern. The citizenry viewed Néstor and Cristina Fernández Kirchner (CFK) as saviors. Both have decreased accountability, circumvented institutions, and issued various decrees. With CFK assuming the vice-presidency after the 2019 elections, the pattern has resumed. The current Alberto Fernández administration has already demonstrated a predilection for decrees and proposed judicial reform decried by critics and the opposition as a move to limit accountability. Within 20 days of taking office, the administration issued four decrees. It has issued 59 decrees in 2020 alone; however, the COVID-19 pandemic, indisputably a legitimate motivation for using “decrees of necessity and urgency,” explains a substantial portion of them.

How can Argentina prevent these patterns from repeating?

A semi-presidential system equips the democratically elected president with substantial powers but also minimizes rule by decree. The system limits the president’s policymaking powers. The locus of policymaking shifts back to the legislature, through the PM, and the nature of the system forces the two branches to negotiate and cooperate. Cooperation, in turn, increases the legitimacy of all parties, produces more moderate but better crafted and implemented policy, and decreases instability. The opposition currently holds a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, meaning Fernández and CFK would have to negotiate and work with them to craft policies. Such a system would limit their ability to unilateral enact policy by decree and add additional layers of horizontal accountability.

Of course, the legislature would have to accept their new power and refrain from re-delegating to the presidency in order for Argentina to curtail the dangers of delegative democracy. However, the semi-presidential system’s structure already limits this possibility. Electoral incentives and the current partisan split between the presidency and the Chamber of Deputies would also encourage the legislature to claim their powers.

Latin America has historically rejected parliaments in favor of presidents. Given the experience of the previous three decades with delegative democracy, however, it is time for the region to reconsider.

1: Peter H. Smith and Cameron J. Sells, ‘Presidents or Parliaments?’, in Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 133–34.

2: Smith and Sells, 134.

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