Japanese Prime Minister visits Vietnam
Following in the footsteps of his predecessor Shinzo Abe,new Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga chose Vietnam as his first official state visit. Suga’s trip to Vietnam, from October 18 to 20, was the first test of the Japanese leader’s mettle, given his lack of extensive diplomatic experience from his tenure as Abe’s deputy. During his trip, Suga emphasized Japan’s commitment to strengthening economic and defense ties in Southeast Asia. Suga’s visit to Vietnam provides keen insight into the Prime Minister’s overall foreign policy strategy.
Given the bleak relations with Seoul and the current geopolitical tensions between Washington and Beijing, many were not surprised that Suga chose Hanoi for his first official state visit. Vietnam’s smart handling of the COVID-19 pandemic makes the trip less risky for the 71-year-old leader. In addition, Vietnam has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, making it an attractive target as Japanese companies start to invest more heavily in the region. Vietnam is also the current Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization of states often at the forefront of Japanese economic and foreign policy.
Meeting with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phoc, Suga sought to deepen economic ties with the Southeast Asian country. Both leaders agreed to accelerate business openings between the two countries amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and the two countries plan to open their borders to each other soon. Suga also brought up Japan’s policy of subsidizing Japanese companies to move out of China and into Southeast Asia—half of the 30 companies participating in the program are planning to move operations to Vietnam. The country is an attractive option for Japanese investors, as Hanoi recently secured a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union and also joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Suga also reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to promoting peace and security in the region. The two leaders set the foundation for Japan to export defense technology to Vietnam. Such defense technology will most likely focus on improving maritime domain awareness and coast guard capabilities, as well as tackling piracy, illegal fishing, and climate change.
However, deterring China, the elephant in the room, seemed the underlying objective of such defense negotiations. While neither country explicitly mentioned China and its aggressions in the South China Sea, the intentions were clear. “Unfortunately, in this region,” Suga said in a speech, “developments contrary to the rule of law and openness upheld by ASEAN have been unfolding.”
“Japan,” he continues, “is strongly opposed to any actions that escalate tensions in the South China Sea.”
Suga’s visit to Vietnam provides significant insight into the Japanese leader’s overall foreign policy strategy. First, continuity from Abe’s foreign policy is clear. Suga, like his predecessor, is chasing stronger Japan-ASEAN economic and security ties and upholding its alliance with the U.S. while still attempting to maintain a stable relationship with China. Suga has also restated Abe’s “free and open Indo-Pacific strategy,” which promotes wider regional integration while maintaining international law—a vision that China has not been particularly keen about.
Given Suga’s visit to Vietnam and his subsequent trip to Indonesia, it seems clear that Japan is jockeying to become a more prominent power in Southeast Asia. With the U.S. and China in an ugly trade spat, and with many of Southeast Asia’s middle powers caught in the crossfire, Japan may become the region’s best economic and political alternative.