Compass World: Russian Toward Compromise, Syriasly

Russian President Putin, left, meets with Turkish President Erdogan, right. (Office of the President of Russia)

Russian President Putin, left, meets with Turkish President Erdogan, right. (Office of the President of Russia)

To avoid a destabilizing influx of yet more Syrian refugees, Turkey urgently needs the Syrian conflict to end in a ceasefire. As forces supporting the Syrian regime close in on Idlib, a northwestern Syrian province, nearly one million Syrians threatened by the violence will seek escape to Turkey. Already housing close to four million Syrian refugees, however, the Turkish state refuses to accept more. Ankara, fearing humanitarian catastrophe, is grasping at straws to somehow stall or eliminate the incoming flood. Surprisingly enough, rather than deal with representatives from the Syrian regime, Turkey looks to resolve this dilemma by turning to Russia, its enemy by proxy and the Syrian state’s main backer.

The Last Stand, For Real This Time

Syrian government forces have made significant headway into Aleppo, which borders Idlib and is considered Syria’s final major rebel stronghold. The offensive forced hundreds of thousands of Syrians to flee their homes. With Russian and Turkish leaders looking to meet next week, the Syrian offensive has exacerbated tensions, dealing a dramatic blow to already strained negotiations.

The meeting follows a previous summit in Ankara, but since then, Turkey's sentiments toward the situation have drastically changed. Attacks by Russian-backed forces killed thirteen Turkish troops, outraging Turkey’s leadership. Turkey has demanded that Russia stop the attacks by the end of the month, threatening military intervention to push back Syrian forces.

A Heart-And-a-Half 

Two interrelated causes are responsible for Russian troops’ presence in Syria. First, during the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided Syria with aid and arms, but assistance dried up after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The friendship regrew when both Vladamir Putin and Bashar al-Assad rose to power in 2000. Second, Russia leveraged this friendship and the Cold War relationship following the 2011 Arab Spring and the destabilizing overthrow of long-time Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Russia, seeking a new consumer for its arms, quickly rediscovered its Cold War ally. 

On the other hand, the Turkish state has half-heartedly supported opposition forces in Syria. Turkey has never desired to be one of the sole backers of Syrian rebel groups. However, following the surprising American withdrawal of troops in October, Turkish objectives rapidly changed. Most recently, this change in spirit has led to Turkey-backed rebels launching their own offensive to recapture areas lost to Syrian government offensives in Idlib. 

Frenemies

With fighting set to worsen, Turkey must seek a solution. Aid organizations warn that the devastating refugee crisis has recently become the worst it has ever been since the conflict began almost a decade ago. Even though collaboration seems unlikely, since both sides support opposing groups, both states have previously cooperated toward a political solution. 

Some believe that Turkey should negotiate directly with the Syrian regime; after all, its forces are leading the offensive. However, direct engagement is unrealistic: Russia is the prime backer of Syria’s government. Through engaging in manipulative diplomacy and military aggression, Russia—and not Turkey—has positioned itself as the fuel to the civil war. As a result, Turkey must appease Russia to even begin to achieve its own objectives. Understanding what Russia’s driving motivations are is, however, another question.