Compass Elections: Early October Roundup
The Reichstag building in Berlin, home of the German Bundestag (Wikimedia Commons)
MERKEL’S PARTY OUT, MERKEL’S MINISTER IN
GERMANY, FEDERAL - SEP 26
BY ANTHONY DUAN
On September 26, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union party, now led by Armin Laschet, saw its worst results since its 1948 formation. Certainly, a large factor in the CDU’s drop in support is due to the fact that many of its former leader Merkel’s supporters were not genuinely conservative, instead being drawn to her personality. But that would belie the reality that the old system of two parties defined by their electoral bases—the CDU and its churchgoers, and its competitor, the Social Democrats (SPD), bastioned by unionized workers—is fading away, with many Germans, especially the youth, disillusioned and looking for a new way out. (And it doesn’t say anything good about her party that without her, Merkel’s own constituency elected a Social Democrat.)
Speaking of the SPD, it cannot be ignored that they have climbed to the top of the electoral standings under Olaf Scholz, Merkel’s finance minister who has claimed to be her true successor while riding on her popular COVID-19 policy. Despite this, however, negotiations are in effect being dominated by the demands of Germany’s two smaller mainstream parties, the environmentally-minded Greens and free-market FDP, who along with the SPD have drawn millions of CDU voters since the 2017 elections. With noted Christian Democrats such as Markus Soder—one of Laschet’s rivals for leadership, and the Minister-President of Bavaria —opining that Scholz is destined for Germany’s highest office, the embattled Laschet seems set to lose this round, all the more predictable given that Scholz prefers a coalition without the CDU.
It should really be no surprise that Laschet lost: being caught on tape laughing during a visit to a town stricken by Germany’s deadly July floods engendered a strong dislike of the man who, despite having governed Germany’s most-populous state, spent less of his campaign discussing policy than demonizing the SPD—the CDU’s own coalition partners in Merkel’s government—as a potential ally to the far-left Linke. This attempted red scare had no basis in reality: not only is such a coalition far from certain due to Scholz’s moderate leanings, it is also mathematically impossible, with the left-leaning parties of the SPD, Greens, and Linke holding a combined total of only 363 seats in the 735-seat Bundestag, or Federal Assembly.
The CDU and SPD have lost votes from their historic Cold War heydays of 40 percent each, with even the SPD winning less than 30 percent of the seats available. While the Greens could take pride in polling at 26 percent of the vote at one point, they failed to dislodge either the CDU or SPD as one of the dominant parties in a new two-party system, and with their leader Annalena Baerbock accused of plagiarism and fraud. Taking the chancellorship appears difficult for them now, even in a coalition. This is not to say that the climate is not Germany’s most pressing issue—as the country moves on from the COVID pandemic which had at one point boosted the CDU’s numbers, and certainly with Greta Thunberg leading Fridays for Future protests in Berlin, Germany is seen as among the epicenters of the emerging climate movement. In fact, one of Germany’s greatest political divides is how to solve the climate crisis, and while the leftist bloc certainly favors more investment in infrastructure and a net-zero carbon target by the end of the 2030s, the right has come out in favor of carbon taxes and the belief that the free market they champion will secure a carbon-free future. Baerbock may call the FDP “deeply socially unjust” and the FDP may retort by claiming to “reconcile climate protection and prosperity,” and with numerous coalitions possible between Germany’s main democratic parties, any governing alliance is far from certain. One thing is clear, however; the CDU will not be as strong as it once was, and considering Soder’s thoughts of Scholz’s chances at becoming Chancellor compared to Laschet’s, it seems unlikely that they will be able to head any government they enter. As tempting as it is to ascribe a newly-dominant role to the Greens, with this being their biggest win in history, their image as a single-issue party with a small tent of mostly urban college students (the near-opposite of the CDU’s “boomer” base) will hamper their efforts at building popular support for a central role in the government to come.
In order of seats won, here are the main German parties, and what they stand for:
Social Democratic Party (SPD, 206 of 735 seats): Germany’s oldest party, was founded in 1875, and it was among the leading parties during the interwar Weimar Republic before being outlawed by the Nazis, who had stolen the less unionized elements of its base. After an unexpected 1949 defeat, it would moderate its initial rhetoric around class struggle and lead the country from 1969 to 1982 under Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. The party briefly returned to power from 1998 to 2005 under Gerhard Schroder, the only time so far where the Greens have been in power as part of a coalition. Its leader is Olaf Scholz.
Christian Democratic Union (CDU, 196 of 735 seats): The party that has governed Germany for 57 of the 72 years since the end of the post-World War II Allied Occupation, its historic role has been as a big tent party that balances conservative Christians with popular centrists. Initially led by the antifascist Mayor of Cologne Konrad Adenauer, who governed for 14 years, it declared a policy of “No experiments!” from the start and committed itself to stability and to the West. Under Helmut Kohl, who governed from 1982 to 1998, the Berlin Wall came down, making the party known as the “Party of Unity.” Though some factions—especially the Bavarian “sister” party known as the Christian Social Union—still oppose abortion and same-sex marriage, Merkel’s government has led the party towards a more secular tone, with her being the most moderate of the party’s three major leaders. As mentioned, its leader is the unpopular Armin Laschet, and it relies heavily upon the elderly and rural voters.
Greens (118 of 735 seats): Essentially a hippie party that became mainstream, and whose support base remains the educated urban youth. Now more pragmatic than they were in the past and openly engaging the center-right in coalition discussions, the Greens are ready to return to power, and now as more than the minor partner they were in the Schroder years. Like the CDU and SPD, they support the EU and NATO, and they have openly criticized the human rights situation in China and Russia. Their belief in state funding for expensive programs has them at odds with the CDU’s “balanced budget” ideal, but the two parties have already teamed up in the southwestern state of Baden-Wurttemberg under a Green premier, so we cannot rule out a federal partnership. Ironically, leader Baerbock does not share her party’s popularity; not only has she been accused of academic fraud, but she has openly supported a speed limit on Germany’s autobahns and the phasing-out of non-electric cars, neither of which settles with the home of Volkswagen—and of not having speed limits whatsoever.
Free Democratic Party (FDP, 92 of 735 seats): A party that advocates for a free market, it is one of the oldest alongside the SPD and CDU. While it has never led a federal government in its history and its leader, Christian Lindner, is not himself particularly notable, it is nonetheless playing a key role in talks with the aforementioned three parties. It didn’t win a single one of the country’s 299 constituencies, but it earned its eighth of Parliament through Germany’s system of mixed-member proportional representation, which promises that an additional number of seats, at least 299 but possibly many more, will be added so that each party’s share of the seats approximately equals their share of the vote. In fact, this Parliament is the largest in history due to those extra seats!
Alternative for Germany (AfD, 83 of 735 seats): Essentially a regional party in the former East German states, it is the first far-right party in the German parliament in decades, and though it has suffered a decline in support since the previous elections in 2017, it still won over a tenth of the vote and came first in two states -- albeit with only a quarter of the vote in each. Beginning as an anti-EU protest party, it quickly developed a following through pandering to anti-immigrant sentiment and has fallen closer to the conspiracist circle on issues such as COVID-19, climate change, and the supposed Islamization of Europe. While some of the party’s former leaders such as Jorg Meuthen and Frauke Petry deplore this course, its current duo of Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla seem set to continue pandering to an extreme section of society that will continue to vote for this party that has absolutely no chance of entering any coalition. Their leader in Thuringia, one of their strongest states, is Bjorn Hocke, a former history teacher whose “wing” of the party has come dangerously close to sporting Nazi rhetoric.
Left (Linke, 39 of 735 seats): A party dominated by supporters of the former communist East Germany, they are unsurprisingly on the far-left of the political spectrum. Their current leaders such as Janine Wissler are essentially useless, and only their former leader Gregor Gysi can save them. Why do I say this? They only captured 4.9 percent of the votes, just below Germany’s 5 percent cutoff for a party to receive representation—their victories in 3 constituencies, including Gysi’s own, saved their necks as much of their voter base fled to other parties—the also-eastern AfD, perhaps? (Note that Germany’s election law accepts 3 constituencies as an equivalent threshold to 5 percent.) Could they work with other parties? Unlikely, considering they wish to either abolish NATO or incorporate Russia within its ranks. On domestic issues, their radical-ness is disputed, but due to their associations with the East German state (even though Gysi has defended civil liberties himself), they have never entered any federal government, just like the AfD. Unlike the AfD, they are nonetheless part of some state governments, making some involvement in coalition-building at the very least possible.
If you bothered to count those seat totals, you would notice one seat remains to be spoken of. The South Schleswig Voters' Association (SSW), a relatively non-ideological regional party intended to represent Germany’s Danish minority, is exempt from the 5 percent threshold and received a single seat in the state of Schleswig-Holstein (along the Danish border) by focusing on cost-of-living issues such as the price of electricity.
GEORGIA DREAMS OF STABILITY
GEORGIA, LOCAL - OCT 2
BY CONNOR WORLEY
Georgia held municipal elections, contested by the governing party Georgian Dream and an opposing coalition known as the United National Movement (UNM), on October 2.
These local elections hold national significance for Georgia. In last year’s parliamentary elections, which Georgian Dream won with approximately 48 percent of the vote, the United National Movement boycotted parliament for months. UNM leader and Tbilisi mayoral candidate Nika Melia was jailed for three months for "fomenting violence."
To stop the spiral towards political instability, Georgian Dream and the UNM agreed to an EU-brokered deal that stipulated Melia be released, and that if Georgian Dream received less than 43 percent of the vote in October's municipal elections, there would be a snap parliamentary election.
The UNM was hesitant to sign on to the agreement but eventually acquiesced. Georgian Dream was also a signatory but later withdrew its support for the deal, effectively making it useless.
According to Foreign Policy reporter Terrell Starr, many Georgians support closer integration with the West and NATO, a key plank of the UNM's platform. However, the more Moscow-friendly Georgian Dream has focused on job security and fighting COVID-19. The pandemic is a highly pressing issue for Georgians because the country is experiencing some of the highest death rates in the world on a per-capita basis. These conflicting issues have caused over half (54 percent, to be precise) of Georgian voters to be undecided about the upcoming election.
There is a real possibility that the governing Georgia Dream will not reach the previously agreed-upon 43 percent threshold. Pro-government outlets show Georgian Dream healthily passing the threshold with 47.6 percent of votes; however, opposition polling predicts Georgian Dream to fall short with only 38.6 percent. UNM falls short of Georgian Dream in both scenarios, with support varying between 27 percent and 33 percent.
To complicate matters further, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili returned from his exile in Ukraine to support the UNM, which he founded. However, immediately after his arrival in Georgia, authorities arrested the former president for "abuses of power." In 2018, Saakashvili was tried and found guilty of abuses and corruption in absentia. Current President Salome Zourabichvili accused Saakashvili of trying to destabilize the country and would not pardon him.
As of writing, with 99.97 percent of votes counted, Georgian Dream has passed the threshold with 46.7 percent of the votes compared to UNM's 30.7 percent. UNM leader Nika Melia fell short of incumbent mayor Kakha Kaladze in the Tbilisi mayoral election, but because neither reached 50 percent, the capital will hold a runoff on October 30th.
A mission of observers from the OSCE said in a statement to Reuters the election had been "marred by wide-spread and consistent allegations of intimidation, vote-buying, pressure on candidates and voters, and an unlevel playing field, although candidates were able to campaign freely.”
Speaking to reporters, Soso Dzamukashvili, junior researcher at Emerging Europe, said, "If Georgian Dream doesn't get what it got in the previous parliamentary elections, which was 48.22 percent, we might have some turmoil again, probably another wave of political crisis.”
Georgian Dream did receive less support than previous parliamentary elections; however, they still passed the crucial 43 percent vote threshold.
MUTED VICTORY IN ICELAND
ICELAND, PARLIAMENTARY - SEP 25
BY ANTHONY DUAN
Despite early accounts indicating a women-majority Parliament, final returns from a recount of Iceland’s parliamentary elections to the Althing show a total of 30 of the 63 seats as being occupied by women, still placing the small Nordic country’s legislature as among the most gender-balanced in the world[1], only being beaten by several Latin American states, the United Arab Emirates, and Rwanda—where more than 60 percent of seats are held by women, and men have consequently been deemed underrepresented. The electoral system is itself a fairly proportional system employing six constituencies of roughly 9 seats each—2 for the capital Reykjavik, one for its suburbs, and 3 in rural regions—and a “national adjustment” of 9 seats, which, while over-representing rural regions, allows for parties to receive seats according to their degree of popular support so long as they receive 5 percent of the vote.
In the meantime, though the ruling coalition may have maintained its majority, Prime Minister Katrin Jakobsdottir’s Left-Green Movement (no guessing its ideology) is now the smallest party in the governing triple alliance after losing three seats, with the conservative Independence Party winning twice as many seats (16 to 8), and the moderate Progressives earning 13, a gain of 5. Unsurprisingly, despite its comfortable 37 seats, the trio is engaging in power talks. With Finance Minister Bjarni Benediktsson, leader of the Independence Party, eyeing the premiership, Iceland may not only lose its hopes for a women-majority legislature, but also its female leadership overall—and ironically to Jakobsdottir’s predecessor, who was forced to resign four years ago for attempting to “restore the honor” of a pedophile.
In any event, a stable government able to complete its term has been much appreciated by the Icelandic populace following a decade of chaos that included 5 elections from 2007 to 2017, with the populace opting for a continuation of this fortunate, if ideologically illogical, arrangement. Melting glaciers and warming temperatures have driven the issue of climate change to the forefront, but the people have opted to stay with the Paris Agreement and not more aggressively cut carbon emissions, demonstrating that at the end of the day, many nations follow former West German Chancellor Adenauer’s ideology of “No Experiments!”
Sadly for Lenya Karim, the 21-year old did not become Iceland’s youngest-ever MP (representing the anti-corruption, libertarian Pirate Party, and no that is not a typo.) Losing her seat in the aforementioned recount, her party did not suffer the misfortunes of Iceland’s Socialists, who despite polling decently well in projections ultimately won zero seats. The majority of parties are vaguely centrist, and generally support some kind of welfare state and limits on immigration, with few being comfortable with EU membership.
[1] This is a good opportunity to note that, in America, women comprise only around ¼ of both houses of Congress.
PUTIN’S PARTY MAINTAINS MAJORITY
RUSSIA, LEGISLATIVE - SEP 17-19
BY ANTHONY DUAN
After 3 days of voting (extended from one due to the COVID pandemic), Russian President Vladimir Putin’s centrist United Russia has maintained its two-thirds majority of over 300 seats in the State Duma, Russia’s Parliament, despite losing 5 percent of the popular vote from the last elections in 2016. The main “opposition” party, the usually-loyal Communists, are claiming fraud and believe that they received more than the 19 percent of votes officially allotted to them, and accusations of ballot stuffing and of individuals forced to vote are rife. The election watchdog Golos has received 5,000 reports of violations, though authorities deny that any of significance occurred, and while there exist Russians who commend Putin for his supposed patriotism, it is impossible to determine whether they truly form half the electorate, though it is doubtful they do.
Putin’s strongest opponent, the jailed Alexey Navalny, has had his movement banned from contesting the elections for supposed extremism, and indeed, while opinion polls had suggested dissatisfaction with Putin’s handling of corruption and living conditions would cost him somewhat, any change to the seat allocation seems quite cleanly managed. Electronic votes suspiciously managed to create a lead for Putin in no less than 15 districts which otherwise would have swung to the opposition, and the only change of note is a new party, “New People,” which barely passed the 5 percent threshold for the 225 seats elected proportionally (the other 225 are elected by districts, a feature which serves to amplify the power of the largest party—with its half of the vote, United Russia won 198 of those 225 seats—almost 90 percent).
Russia’s three traditional opposition parties may have taken the bulk of the seats United Russia didn’t, but it would be an error to think of them as a truly realistic alternative. The Communists, led by veteran politician Gennady Zyuganov, are unsurprisingly the descendants of the old Soviet party, and their support base consists of older workers who share the USSR’s dislike of capitalism and privatization, yet who are also fiercely patriotic. Anti-Ukrainian and anti-LGBTQ+, they would not align well with the American left whatsoever. The Liberal Democrats are not liberals at all, but rather right-wing populists led by the brash nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who supports an authoritarian, anti-Western state dominated by ethnic Russians. Their slate tends to receive the backing of many poorer men in rural areas—perhaps because they advocate for free vodka, polygamy, and the execution of criminals. Just Russia, led by Sergey Mironov, attempts to balance opposition to United Russia with support for Putin and is essentially a moderate “social justice” party. Unsurprisingly, all maintain what limited influence they have through barely criticizing Putin’s policies as a “system opposition”—formally unaligned, de facto puppets.
SWITZERLAND LEGALIZES SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
SWITZERLAND, REFERENDUM - SEP 26
BY ANTHONY DUAN
With a long tradition of direct democracy—two of its cantons continue to hold an assembly of eligible voters in lieu of a true legislature—it should come as no surprise that this past year has seen ten national referendums in the small European state of Switzerland. Most are ignored by nearly everyone, but in a vote held just days ago, Switzerland legalized gay marriage. While Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary have constitutionally banned the practice, the Swiss people—two-thirds of them, in fact—have made it clear that in their country, two adults who wish to enter into such a contract shall not be prevented from doing so.
While the first marriages are not planned for until July 2022, Justice Minister Karin Keller-Sutter is hailing the decision as a victory for love, despite opposition from the right-wing People’s Party, which is lambasting a supposed loss for fathers, children, and the traditional family (despite this initiative enabling same-sex couples to adopt and have children.)
AN IMPORTANT REFERENDUM IN AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY
SAN MARINO, REFERENDUM - SEP 26
BY ANTHONY DUAN
The tiny European country of San Marino has banned abortion since 1865, but the issue has never been a significant one in national politics: with their country completely surrounded by Italy, Sammarinese women simply travel there whenever they need the procedure, although they have to spend almost $2000 and face imprisonment if the procedure is done in San Marino. That is, until a few days ago, when the ancient republic and city-state cast more than three-quarters of its votes in favor of legalizing abortion until 12 weeks and to save the mother’s life afterward. Voter turnout was 40 percent.
Other small European states such as Malta, Andorra, and the Vatican maintain a ban, but with Ireland having legalized abortion not too long ago, and keeping in mind that San Marino is a country where women have only been allowed to hold political office since 1974, we must realize that progress is indeed being made.
Speaking of San Marino’s political offices, they do truly follow the traditions of an Italian city-state in lacking a “normal” president and legislature. While their Parliament, the Grand and General Council, appears not too different from any European country’s assembly—despite consisting of a large 60 members for a country of only 30,000 inhabitants—it is their office of president (or perhaps, the lack of one) that is the most distinctive. In lieu of an executive role, they are led by two mostly-ceremonial “Captains-Regent” who serve concurrently and are elected by the Council to six-month terms—the shortest in the world. Their inauguration dates are April 1 and October 1 every year, so without further delay, we congratulate tennis player Francesco Mussoni and Giacomo Simoncini, the youngest Captain-Regent in history at only 26 years of age!