And the Rest is History

A 20-episode docuseries on the Korean War is being aired daily across the Chinese national broadcaster (CCTV) starting last week. This is part of a series of moves in China’s weeklong national celebration of the 70th anniversary of its entry into the Korean War, or as the CCP calls it, the “War to Resist American Aggression and Aid Korea.” 

The commemoration was kicked off by Xi’s visit to the national military museum, followed by a public letter written to Korean War veterans, and capped by a moving and hawkish speech signalling Chinese resolve to stand up against its competitors. Namely, the US. Xi’s voice rang in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing: “Confronted with any hardships or dangers, the calves of their legs will not shake, and their backs will not bend.”

This is all strategic. The scale and rhetoric used in anniversaries of this war ebb and flow to US-China relations. In 1970, following the resumption of diplomatic talks under Nixon, China, seeking better relations, did not hold a 20th anniversary celebration. It seeked to downplay historical antagonism. However, in 2000, after an American bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War and continued deterioration of US-China relations, Beijing held a commemorative ceremony with six thousand officials in attendance. Chinese leader Jiang Zemin visited veterans and Beijing hosted a museum exhibit memorializing the war. 

Similarly, the highly public and inflammatory nature of this year’s decennial celebration is indicative of the current high-strung relations between the two great powers. 

The Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953, is often forgotten in the US but constantly invoked as an opportunity to arouse anti-US sentiment in China.  On October 19, 1950, Mao made the fateful decision to send troops to side with North Korea following the US’ backing of South Korea. The war holds symbolic meaning for the Chinese: the triumph of Eastern communism over Western democracy and imperialism. It is also a story of the victory of the underdog. 

Well...victory, but not quite. The war technically ended in a draw, with joint Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean forces pushing US-led UN Command forces back to the 38th parallel, where it all started. To this day, peace is held by a ceasefire and no formal peace treaty. 

Mao’s risky decision seventy years ago framed one of the most contentious issues underlying US-China relations today: Taiwan. The ‘victory’ in the Korean War was crucial in establishing Chinese national identity and proving its strength to a skeptical international community in the country’s infancy. But, it may also have squandered one of China’s best opportunities to capture Taiwan in a rare moment of diverted US attention and weak Taiwanese national unity. 

The Korean War came just barely a year after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. China was weak—militarily, economically, and politically. Mao had just emerged from a divisive and bloody civil war against Chang Kai-Shek’s nationalist forces that retreated to Taiwan in May of 1950. The US promised not to take sides in the civil war, at least not explicitly.

This all changed on June 25, 1950. Kim Jung-Il’s forces crossed the 38th parallel, demarcating the boundary between the Soviet-backed North Korea from the pro-Western South Korea. At the onset of the war, China had no intention of intervening beyond providing moral support to Kim Jung-Il. The US, afraid of seeping Soviet influences in the region during the Cold War, immediately led UN Command forces to reinforce South Korea and push into North Korea. Fearing that Soviet influences could also reach the newly-established Taiwan, Truman deployed the US 7th fleet to secure the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese propaganda to generate public support for the war. The right reads “War to Resist American Aggression and Aid Korea.” The left reads “protect our homes and defend our country.” (Baidu Commons) 

This move angered the Chinese. Truman had blocked Mao’s ability to attack Chiang and stymied his ultimate mission to reunify Taiwan. According to Shen Zhihua, a history professor at East China Normal University, “[t]he intrusion of the US 7th Fleet deprived the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) legitimacy to liberate Taiwan, as well as blocked their way to land on the island … such a move ignited Mao’s anti-American anger.”

Mao had long regarded the US as an imperialist power seeking to encroach on Chinese sovereignty ever since the end of World War II. Mao insisted China could not sit by and do nothing against the ‘foreign imperialists’ that were at their doorstep. 

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There was another consideration at play. The border between North Korea and China was marked by the Yalu River. Under Mao, most of China’s manufacturing industry was located in the northeast, precisely along the Yalu border. When the US invaded North Korea, China felt threatened at the border. A take-down of the manufacturing industry for a newly established China would be lethal for its industrialization and development.

The decision to intervene was not an easy one. Mao knew he would be matching up against one of the strongest militaries in the world that could dominate in the air and the seas. But Mao regarded US involvement in the war as an existential threat along with its presence in the Taiwan Strait. Mao proclaimed China needed to enter the war to “protect our homes and defend our country.” (保家卫国)

Here lies the critical juncture. Mao threw his support behind Kim, putting his mission to capture Taiwan on hold. Mao viewed the liberalization of Taiwan to be a task that was waiting for him following the Korean War. Little did he know that window of opportunity was short-lived.  The US later hardened its support for Taiwan and a stronger national unity among its people was forged. And the rest is history.

While the war is regarded a draw on paper, China considers it a momentous victory because the cards were stacked overwhelmingly against it. Underrated, under-equipped, and under-armed, China fought its way to a draw by matching guns with human shields and human bullets. The Chinese crossing over the Yalu River was dubbed by troops as “The Gates to Hell.”

American POWs captured by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) in the Korean War. (Wikimedia Commons)

Years later, there’s still debate over whether Mao’s decision to intervene was right. Most of the Chinese troops employed in the war were formed by volunteers in the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA). The official Chinese government reports the Korean War claimed a total of 180,000 Chinese lives. However, the number could go as far as 900,000. Li Shenzhi, a pro-democracy academic reported on the conflict for the Xinhua News Agency: “Mao dragged China into it because he wanted to be a hero.” 

Inarguably, China was at a difficult crossroad in 1950: either to lend support to North Korea to stand up against an encroaching US which it considered to be an imperialist power or to use that war as a diversion to cross the Yangtze and capture Taiwan. China chose the former. And that has made all the difference.

Seventy years later, with the benefit of hindsight, the Korean War is cast in a new light. It is a war that came with great benefits at a great cost—a war that laid the foundation for China’s strength and legitimacy, but left an unresolved conflict that has become China’s greatest thorn.