Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Serbia’s Foreign Policy Balancing-Act Between Russia and the West
Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikola Selaković (Flikr).
On September 23, Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikola Selaković and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed a Plan of Consultation amid the 77th meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York. The agreement signals the states’ intent to collaborate on foreign policy matters for the next two years, despite offering few specific deliverables.
However, just two days after the signing, the Serbian government denounced Russia’s referendums in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporzhzhia. This apparent u-turn represents a wider issue facing Serbian international affairs: how can the country balance its historic alliance with Russia with its hopes of joining the European Union (EU)?
Serbia frequently finds itself torn between Russia and the West. In December 2009, the country applied for EU membership, and in January 2014, it began accession talks. However, these talks have achieved little success, as Serbia has opened only 18 of 25 negotiating chapters, provisionally closing just two.
At the same time, Serbia has also sought to maintain friendly relations with Russia, a longtime ally. Serbia relies heavily on Russian natural gas imports, and the Russian government also supports Serbia’s rejection of Kosovo’s independence in international bodies including the United Nations. For these reasons, Serbian leaders refuse to join EU sanctions on Russia.
The Russia-Ukraine war has only exacerbated Serbia’s dilemma, further pressuring the nation to pick a side. This fact manifested itself in last week’s events, constituting a continuation of Serbia’s mixed signals and the world’s push for a decision.
The Serbia-Russia agreement sparked backlash in an already-frustrated European Union. In June, the EU issued a report noting the importance of “[prioritizing] the alignment of accession countries with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and continue accession negotiations with Serbia only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia.” Thus, the EU responded negatively to last week’s agreement. EU Executive Commission spokesperson, Peter Stano, commented that the consultation plan was a “very clear sign about their intention to strengthen their ties, and this is raising serious questions.”
Seeking to dispel EU fears, Selaković described the agreement as a “technical document.” Furthermore, in a seeming about-face, Serbia refused to recognize the results of Russian referendums in occupied portions of Ukraine. Outlining this decision, Serbian President Aleksander Vucic stated, “Serbia….will not recognize the [referendums] as it adheres to international law, the United Nations Charter, and UN resolutions.”
Despite this, Serbia has been able to balance its commitments to the EU and Russia. The country remains a candidate for EU membership. However, as recently as May, Vucic signed a gas deal with Russia. However, as the EU begins to question Serbia’s commitment to taking action against Russia’s war in Ukraine, the future of the Serbian balancing act seems precarious. Commenting on the situation, Molovan Božilović, the country’s former ambassador to Austria, noted that the agreement constitutes an “unnecessary but dangerous provocation towards countries that condemn Russia for the war in Ukraine…These intentions are unclear and a type of dangerous political exhibitionism.”
It remains unclear whether Serbia’s denouncement of Russia’s referendums will quell Western fears or if the Serbo-Russian Plan of Consultation has caused irreversible damage to the country’s dreams of EU accession. However, as Europe divides itself into two camps surrounding the invasion of Ukraine, neutrality grows increasingly difficult.