Compass Elections: October 2022 Roundup

Map of the October 30 runoff election. Blue represents states where the majority voted for Bolsonaro, while red indicates states that voted for Lula.

BOLSONARO TO ALLOW TRANSITION AS LULA NARROWLY WINS BRAZIL PRESIDENCY

BRAZIL, PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF - OCT 30

By Shajaka Shelton and Gabrielle Cunningham

Former left-wing Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known to the world as Lula, defeated incumbent right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro with a narrow 50.9% of the votes during the run-off election on Oct. 30.

The presidential election went to a second round after neither Lula nor Bolsonaro were able to secure a simple majority during the first round of elections on Oct. 2. Bolsonaro led the first results to come in, only for Lula to narrowly pull ahead as the count proceeded. Lula’s slow rise in the counting is mostly attributed to the tendency of his party, the Workers’ Party, to have its strongholds in slower-voting northern regions..

Bolsonaro’s defeat marks the first incumbent loss in a Brazilian presidential election in 34 years, as well as the public’s rejection of Bolsonaro’s right-wing populist politics that facilitated accelerated degradation of the Amazon and nearly 700,000 deaths during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also marks yet another leftist leader to be elected recently in Latin America, lending credibility to the idea that a second “Pink Tide” is sweeping across the region, after the initial tide in the early 2000s.

Before the count even finished, both the Workers’ Party and Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party made accusations of election interference. In particular, the Federal Highway Police (PRF) has been accused of attempting to suppress voting by strategically setting up checkpoints to delay voters in regions where Lula was predicted to have the majority vote.

Silvinei Vasques, Director of the PRF, had made his support for Bolsonaro public knowledge via a now-deleted Instagram post endorsing the candidate, fuelling public speculation that the PRF had become weaponized in Bolsonaro’s favor. Chief Electoral Authority and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered Vasques to remove the checkpoints, but also denied the Workers Party’s demand for extended poll hours to make up for delays voters may have experienced.

On the other hand, Eduardo Bolsonaro, Federal Deputy for São Paulo and son of President Bolsonaro, accused the Workers’ Party of buying votes by illegally transporting voters to polls on election day and claimed that the PRF checkpoints were attempting to counteract it. On Oct. 30, he tweeted “We have operation ‘flip vote.’ The [Worker’s Party] has a vote buying [operation] and they are upset that the police are working. Number 302 of the penal code says it’s a crime to buy food and transportation on election day. Please let the police work, and arrest anyone who wants to stop them.”

Allegations of corruption are nothing new for Lula. In 2017, Lula was sentenced to 22 years in prison for his role in Operation Car Wash, a corruption scandal involving many Workers’ Party officials accepting bribes in exchange for giving government contracts to the oil giant Petrobras. Lula was released in 2019 after serving less than 2 years as his charges were thrown out due to collusion between the federal judge that sentenced him, Sergio Moro, and his prosecutors.

Meanwhile, following Lula’s victory, Bolsonaro remained silent for almost two days, worrying observers that he could react drastically to the results of the election given his statement in a speech last year that he “[had] three options for [his] future: being arrested, killed, or victory.” In his Nov. 1 address, Bolsonaro did not formally concede the election nor mention his opposition, but his Chief of Staff, Ciro Nogueira, emphasized that a transition of power would begin soon.

Although the Bolsonaro campaign promised a peaceful transition of power, concerns remain about Bolsonaro or his supporters contesting the results, Leading up to the election, Bolsonaro popularized concerns of election fraud, especially over Brazil’s use of electronic voting machines. He laid the groundwork for potential objections, saying “the system is completely vulnerable” while campaigning. He made similar claims in 2018 despite winning the election in the run-off, saying that voter fraud was the reason he did not win the election in the first round.

Emboldened by Bolsonaro’s 2 days of silence, his supporters built over 500 barricades and lit fires on highways in 18 Brazilian states. Led primarily by semi truck drivers, they aimed to block key state and commercial functions. In Bolsonaro’s speech, he didn’t directly endorse the protestors’ actions, but did refer to them as “peaceful” and said they were the fruit of “a sense of injustice.”

Once the transition occurs, Lula may continue to struggle with protests by Bolsonaro supporters, with some even worryingly calling for the Brazilian military to intervene. Additionally, Bolsonaro may face charges previously inhibited by his executive immunity.

So far, federal police have been investigating Bolsonaro on charges of embezzlement, theft, and mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as breaking secrecy laws. Brazil’s presidential immunity holds that only the Attorney General and Supreme Court can investigate and prosecute a sitting president, though now that Bolsonaro has lost, he can be investigated and tried without these constraints.

In wake of his victory, Lula said that he “consider[s] [him]self as someone who’s been resurrected.” As president, he promises to return Brazil’s economy and democracy to the state they were during his first presidential run from 2003 to 2010.

While experts worry that Lula will not be able to restore the economy to its previous state, as he had previously capitalized on a commodity boom that has since ended, he may still be able to partially address Brazil’s slow growth and rising poverty—and perhaps more importantly, stabilize the country after the chaotic Bolsonaro years.

CHAOS IN THE BALKANS – WHAT'S NEW?

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, GENERAL (LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL) - OCT 2

By Brendan Carroll

Bosniak Denis Becirovic and Croat Zeljko Komsic, reformist presidential candidates in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) region, triumphed in this year’s elections on October 2. The third victor, Zeljka Cvijanovic, is a pro-Russian Serb from the autonomous Republika Srpska (RS). Milorad Dodik, leader of Cvijanovic’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrat (SNSD) party and fellow pro-Russian, won the RS regional presidency, returning to his former position after 2 terms as the Serb president of Bosnia.

To understand the impact of these elections—and why three presidents declared victory—one must understand Bosnia’s complex voting system. With 3 state presidents, 2 regional presidents, and dozens of candidates in each election, keeping track of it all can be a mess. It’s no wonder only about 50 percent of voters came out to the polls. With minimal results in previous years and mile-long ballots, voter disillusionment continues to grow. As such, it is important to consider the historical and political contexts of these elections—commonly considered the most muddled in Europe.

Unfortunately, the newest round of electoral outcomes do not bode well for the reformist agenda. Dodik and Cvijanovic’s foreboding victories overshadow those of Becirovic and Komsic. Even with some people’s minds towards reform, the persistent support for separatist Serb leaders points to the looming threat of reignited civil war or Serb secession from the state.

The Presidential Elections

The Bosnian Presidency is not a solo job; in fact, it is one highly predicated on ethnic division. The tripartite presidency reserves a place for one president of each “major” ethnic group: the Muslim Bosniaks, the Roman Catholic Croats, and the Eastern Orthodox Serbs.

The seventeen other ethnic groups in the territory—including Jewish and Roma peoples—are labeled as “others” under the constitutions of the state. They may vote, but they are barred from running for the presidency (even though the European Court of Human Rights has ruled the barriers are rights violations).

To add to the division, presidents are only allowed to run in their own autonomous regional states. Bosniaks and Croats can only run for president from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (non-Republika regions), where they constitute 70.4 and 22.4 percent of the population, respectively. Serb candidates must hail from the Republika Srpska region, where they comprise 83 percent of the total population.

Ironically, the division initially aimed to unite the country after the 1995 Dayton Agreement ending the Bosnian War. Yet, it instead contributes to ingrained ethnic divisions, leading to more nationalistic allegiance than united Bosnian patriotism.

The tripartite presidency fuels regional divides as well. As the non-Republika regions and Republika Srpska function relatively autonomously, their presidents oversee region-specific activities and decisions. Their policies can make-or-break interregional relations and the feasibility of a united Bosnia.

Srpska’s Old Familiar Face

This year, only one regional presidential election took place—but it may have been the most telling of any. The state election commission announced Milorad Dodik as the victor over newcomer Jelena Trivic, with a vote split of 48 percent to 43.

Yet Dodik didn’t lead on election night. Trivic, who maintained the lead at midnight, declared victory, only to wake up and see an apparent defeat. Supporters raged, lambasting Dodik for rigging the election and calling for a recount. The people got what they requested, but even after the recount, Dodik remained in the lead.

Even if the results of the recount were in Trivic’s favor, though, it may not have swayed Dodik. To an enthused crowd during the recount period, Dodik exclaimed, “I am here tonight to tell you that Milorad Dodik is going nowhere.”

The rejection of election processes on both sides is a grim sign. With people already dejected from voting, extreme doubts about electoral legitimacy cause greater allegiance among the people to demagogue politicians than certified voting officials. Whatever results come, it seems some voting group is likely to reject their legitimacy.

Two Reformists, One Nationalist, No Compromise

While three presidents may seem like a lot, in comparison to the candidate tally, it’s not nearly as bewildering. A whopping 117 candidates ran this year—90 party or coalition affiliated, and 27 independent—whittling down to Komsic, Becirovic, and Cvijanovic in the end.

The Bosniak candidate, Becirovic, beat the incumbent and career politician Bakir Izetbegovic, in a landslide win. Becirovic, a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party, is only the second candidate not from the conservative Party of Democratic Action to occupy the seat.

A champion of decreasing ethnocentrism, Becirovic seems to be the progress-minded candidate discontented voters have yearned for. The overwhelming support he received from numerous aligned parties is further evidence of his popularity. Even Izetbegovic admitted, “How can you expect to win when 11 parties are against you?”

Komsic, a Croat, won nearly 70% of the vote in preliminary results. Such popularity can be deceiving, though. Since Bosniaks and Croats both live in the BiH, the two groups have the option to vote for either a Bosniak or Croat candidate in the elections. As such, many Croats are discontented, believing the Komsic’s victory was heavily influenced by the more plentiful Bosniak voters within the region. The perceived discrimination leads to disillusionment and increased nationalistic rhetoric. For a candidate who was expected to be focused on reform, the basis of suspicion and broken support already serves as a poor sign of what lies ahead.

Beyond the grievances towards these electoral outcomes, the issue of Cvijanovic still pervades. Filling the role of Dodik as he returns to RS, nationalists now control the Serbian regional and statewide presidency with Cvijanovic’s victory. This is increasingly concerning considering Dodik’s recent lean towards RS secession. From banning statewide agencies like security and the judiciary from functioning in RS, to forming of a separate RS army and medication procurement agency, RS moves closer and closer to total autonomy by the day—with tacit support by Russia, in an attempt to build its influence in the Balkans.

With Cvijanovic at the helm, potential progress with her reformist contemporaries is unlikely to produce meaningful change for all. The question of whether such change can exist is an even greater issue. With Russia persistent in its war-efforts in Ukraine despite repeated setbacks, and Bosnia’s intensifying regional divisions, the watershed moment of change Bosnians so desperately long for seems further away than ever.

ON THE FAR END OF EUROPE, TORN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

BULGARIA, LEGISLATIVE - OCT 2

By Ryan Finster

On October 2, Bulgaria held its fourth inconclusive parliamentary election in the span of two years as the country faces a harsh winter amidst rising inflation and the war in Ukraine. As expected, the results signified the effective political stalemate plaguing the Eastern European country since the ousting of former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov in May of last year.

While no party was able to gain anything close to a majority in the November 2021 elections, the winning We Continue the Change party, led by Kiril Petkov, was able to form a coalition with three other parties: BSP for Bulgaria, There Is Such a People, and Democratic Bulgaria. However, There Is Such a People withdrew from the bloc in June after accusing government leaders of misappropriation of funds, and spurred by the Petkov government’s falling public approval, Borisov, who leads the conservative GERB party that held power in Bulgaria from 2009 to 2021, launched a successful vote of no confidence.

The key difference between the November 2021 and October 2022 elections is We Continue the Change’s performance, as the party’s vote share fell from 25 percent to just under 20 percent. Borisov and GERB slightly increased their share from 22 percent to 25 percent of the vote, but coupled with the collapse of the four-party coalition, that quarter was enough to solidify GERB’s reemergence as the leading power in parliament. Unfortunately, there are few prospects for any of the significant parties or their constituents to align or coalesce with GERB, thus creating a power-vacuum that could easily lead to a weak minority government – or no government at all.

Bulgaria has historically been aligned with Russia, but the Petkov government was seen as friendly to pro-EU and pro-NATO interests, sharply condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The war has played a large role in recent foreign and domestic policy, particularly concerning the skyrocketing cost of living due to the war’s effects on energy prices. While Borisov has repeatedly stressed that he stands firmly behind Ukraine, his past premierships were characterized by a careful balancing act between Russia and the West, seen in areas such as Bulgaria’s heavy reliance on Russian state-run natural gas company Gazprom.

This balancing act has continued under current President Rumen Radev, considered both the country’s most popular politician and a relative Russophile. Under Bulgaria’s parliamentary system, the president holds the power to appoint caretaker governments, meaning the current Prime Minister Galab Donev essentially follows the lead of Radev, who has questioned Bulgaria’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict and refused to send Ukraine weapons.

Nevertheless, Borisov’s speeches post-election have tried to paint a picture of cross-party unity and cooperation, in the hopes of facilitating the formation of a coalition. Alluding to the cut-throat political disarray of the past two years, Borisov stated: “Now is not the right time for dominance, but for seeking unity.”

While many question both the intentions and feasibility of Borisov’s plan of collaboration under shared pro-Western interests, his tone comes at a critical moment for Bulgaria. October’s snap election saw a mere 39 percent voter turnout, largely driven by deep-seated and increasing discontent with government corruption, while polls have suggested that as many as “80 percent of Bulgarians want to see a new government instead of another election.” How Borisov and GERB handle this disaffection could drastically influence Bulgaria’s future prospects, both for the coming winter and for long-term stability.