ANALYSIS: Russia is Trying to Expand in West Africa. Can The West Prevent It?

Suspected Russian mercenaries provide security for the president of the Central African Republic (Wikimedia).

The soldiers descended on the central Malian town of Moura on March 27, 2022. They claimed they were there to look for jihadists, who the government believed were planning a meeting in the town. Accompanying them were what villagers described as “white men speaking a bizarre language.” 

After a short shootout with armed jihadists, the soldiers began rounding up hundreds of unarmed men throughout the village and taking them to a secluded area east of the town. Over the next few days, government and foreign soldiers proceeded to summarily executed over 300 men in one of the worst massacres of West Africa’s war on terror. 

For years, any foreign soldiers working with the Malian Armed Forces would have been from Western Europe. But many Western nations have retreated from Africa in the face of growing public resentment among African locals and at home. The country that has taken their place and provided the soldiers for the Moura operation is Russia, which is making a move to become a dominant security partner in Africa, no matter what it takes. If Western nations hope to reverse the democratic backsliding on the continent, they may have to confront Russia’s growing presence.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was little in the way of a Russo-African relationship. Chaos at home and on its borders meant the relationships the Soviet Union cultivated during Africa’s post-colonial wars were largely abandoned. It was not until the annexation of Crimea and the international isolation that followed that the Kremlin began seeking out African allies. The draw was the continent’s abundant natural resources and the possibility of cultivating friends along NATO’s southern flank.  

While Russia lacks the economic power of a country like China, which has made inroads with its Belt and Road Initiative, its military has proven to be a useful bargaining tool. The Kremlin’s foot soldiers in Africa are Wagner Group, a shadowy mercenary organization with strong ties to Russian military intelligence and President Vladimir Putin. Arms sales have also become an essential part of Russian diplomacy in the region, with 21 different African countries receiving weapons from Russia.

In 2017, Wagner was deployed to Sudan to help put down an uprising against then-dictator Omar al-Bashir; in exchange, Russian oligarch and leader of Wagner Yevgeny Prizoghin received exclusive rights to mine gold in the country. In 2018, the mercenaries began fighting insurgents in the Central African Republic while Prizoghin gained diamond and gold mining rights. Wagner also assisted Libyan General Khalifa Haftar's march on Tripoli in 2019, helping capture multiple oil fields.  

However, the most concerning use of Wagner Group has been its move to replace the withdrawing Western security infrastructure in the Sahel. The turbulent region has faced ongoing crises over the past two years. Since the start of 2020, there have been coups in Mali, Chad, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, which have all followed a similar playbook: A military officer capitalizes on the anger over a failure to contain the Islamic insurgencies that have plagued the region, and then overthrows the government

The recent string of coups have strained relations between the West African region and its Western counterparts, particularly the French, who many Africans blame for failing to stem the escalating insurgent threat and refusing to try and negotiate a peaceful settlement. In response, Mali has contracted with Wagner Group since late 2021, and Burkina Faso is also believed to be considering deploying the mercenaries.  

Many of these Western nations are now deciding to cut their losses and pull back. In early November 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the French military mission in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger would officially end, removing over 5,000 soldiers from the region. Britain and Germany also announced that they would leave Mali’s UN peacekeeping mission. 

Yet the withdrawal of Western forces is sure to push West Africa closer to Russia and damage, if not outright destroy, the hope of a return to civilian rule in the aftermath of the string of coups. If the Wagner group becomes essential for the juntas to remain in power, their countries are at risk of becoming client states, required to hand over natural resources in order to maintain their security. On the other hand, if the West wishes to keep their influence, Western forces could agree to remain with conditions, primarily commitments from junta leaders that they will return to civilian rule as quickly as possible.  

Such a proposal would not mean that, if Western nations remain, the junta leaders would revert to the status quo. A major problem with Western strategy has been a focus on pure military cooperation, making everyday people see Western countries as occupying forces. To make their presence more appealing than the Russian one, countries like France and the United States should begin working with the transnational groups that already exist in the region. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) already coordinates economic policy between 15 West African nations while also attempting to increase military cooperation to fight terrorism. 

ECOWAS has already proven effective in confronting democratic backsliding; after a coup in a member state, ECOWAS suspends the state’s membership and imposes economic sanctions. It then relieves this pressure if the country starts moving toward elections. ECOWAS was essential in convincing the junta in Guinea to restore civilian rule in 2 years instead of 3 after a September 2021 coup. A further partnership with ECOWAS in the economic sector will provide Western intervention the legitimacy of a partnership with a proven and trusted organization and can also offer genuine relief to a region suffering from the economic disaster started by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Western security assistance to West Africa, coupled with new initiatives for economic development, could strongly counter Russian influence, which would not just be beneficial in global power competition but, as the Moura massacre showed, help protect innocent lives. It will also pressure countries that have faced military takeovers to return to civilian rule as quickly as possible so they can receive the benefits the rest of the region will obtain from further Western investment. 

The economic benefits can also go both ways, West Africa is rich in natural resources, such as lithium and bauxite, that are needed for many modern technologies and can be traded far more reliably with a strong security infrastructure in place. However, when these economic agreements are made there must be assurances that they will not result in the same level of exploitation currently practiced by Western corporations in the region. This economic aspect is another area where working with ECOWAS to implement standards region wide could provide key benefits.  

None of this work is easy, and it would require a far greater commitment than the simple “war on terror” paradigm that has driven the West’s African policy for years. Still, the benefits would be clear: A stable and democratic West Africa and a denial of Russian attempts to export their brand of authoritarianism and brutality.