Compass Elections: Late Fall Roundup
Advertisements for the Japanese general election, Tokyo (Wikimedia Commons)
Repression in Uzbekistan: President Mirziyoyev Claims Progress
Uzbekistan, Presidential - Oct 24
by Anthony Duan
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received 80 percent of the vote in the country’s recent election, which had a suspiciously-high turnout also of 80 percent. What’s more, Although Mirziyoyev’s campaign was nominally a re-election effort, his opponents were almost entirely unknown to the general public, making any real competition difficult. While other candidates had garnered some support, they conveniently seemed unable to register with the Uzbek election authority, thus paving the way for Mirziyoyev’s victory
Jokes aside, Uzbekistan has never known true democracy, and this election has not changed this reality. Islam Karimov governed the country from the fall of the Soviet Union until the his death in 2016. Under Karimov, Uzbekistan notoriously acted as a police state, having no term limits, press restrictions, and thousands of political prisoners. Public protests often led to death, yet the country’s large reserves of natural gas and strategic location on Afghanistan’s northern border meant that the West could never wholly cut off the dictatorship.
Mirziyoyev likely intends for this election to show the world that his New Uzbekistan has progressed past this dark era. He has abolished Karimov’s brutal practice of drafting citizens into slave labor in Uzbekistan’s cotton fields and has lifted several Soviet-style rules governing production and residence. Restrictions on public religious practices have also been ameliorated, allowing the devout to resume donning their headscarves, and a number of political prisoners have been released. Moreover, in an attempt to rise above the middle-income ranks, Uzbekistan has liberalized its regulations on currency conversions and foreign trade, which has strengthened local businesses. The state speaks of economic development and solidifying ties with its neighbors, though it faces challenges inherent to an economy which remains dominated by the public sector (representing 55 percent of assets) and to a political system that offers few liberties.
While four other candidates contested the election, all came from pro-government parties that posed no threat to the incumbent. Although Mirziyoyev’s genuine electoral results cannot be discounted - with many Uzbeks happy support for the economic and personal freedoms he has granted them - any actual opponents to the government will find their rights curtailed. In the past, opposition activists have had issues with leaving the country, reporting threats to their families, such as shutting off electricity. Arrest remains a real threat for attendees of opposition rallies, and false charges of debts and sedition remain a crucial tool for Mirziyoyev, who has faced accusations of corruption, to escape the watchful eye of dissidents. The government has also disrupted other sites such as Twitter in efforts to monitor potential dissent.
The Uzbek elections formally take place in the context of a two-round system, where an absolute majority is required for a candidate to win. In this election, where 80 percent of ballots went to the victor, the results from the second round have yet to come in. Interestingly, 80 percent is actually the lowest of any winning candidate in the history of Uzbekistan, although this relatively “low” percentage is seen by many as a way for Mirziyoyev to claim that his country is democratizing, as it is not so blatantly fraudulent as 90 percent. Regardless, Mirziyoyev has demonstrated his ability to maintain control over Uzbekistan, and the second round of votes will likely affirm his position.
Victory For Kishida, Victory For The Conservatives, Victory For The Liberals - Wait What?
Japan, General - Oct 31
by Anthony Duan
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has cemented his leadership over the Japanese ruling party: will he be successful? (Wikimedia Commons)
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), so named despite being conservative, has maintained its majority in the lower house of the Japanese National Diet: the House of Representatives. As the LDP has almost always governed Japan and has lost only two elections since the 1950s, it was always expected to take the lion’s share of the vote. Results held true to that prediction: the party itself captured 247 of the 465 seats in the House, while 27 seats were taken by its coalition partner Komeito. Nevertheless, while this figure represents control of the Cabinet and of parliamentary committees, it also represents a 31-seat decline from the 305 seats that Kishida’s supporters held prior to the vote. In large part, this drop was to the benefit of the similarly right-wing but more populist Innovation Party, which further consolidated its hold over the crucial metropolis of Osaka.
Of course, since Japan is merely a dominant-party state rather than a true single-party one, its government is accountable to an electorate that certainly can vote them out if they choose to (which did in fact occur in 1993 and 2009.) Early exit polls left the LDP fearing that Komeito’s support would be necessary to form a government–certainly an indignity for the balena bianca of the Far East. The right-wing party has, as before, pledged to increase funding for the country’s Self-Defense Forces, but has faced new challenges during the coronavirus pandemic, which saw the rise and fall of its previous leader, Yoshihide Suga. In response to the crisis, Kishida has promised a second government budget to provide for those most affected by the pandemic, such as students and the unemployed, who have faced difficulty entering or reentering the job market. In fact, the party has advocated for a “new capitalism,” which, while certainly not directly implying socialism, has some on edge as to what the centrist Kishida intends to do. He is no stranger to some progressive positions, advocating Japan’s involvement in the COP26 conference to promote an eventual goal of net-zero carbon emissions, and while he supports a buildup of greater military power, he also supports doing so in a manner proportional to old adversaries (such as China) advancing their own technology. Unlike Shinzo Abe, who dominated Japan for the better part of a decade, Kishida is not a right-wing firebrand, placing little emphasis on revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which has constrained its military power since World War II’s aftermath. Additionally, though Kishida has not visited Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates many of Japan’s fallen in that war including war criminals, he has nonetheless been criticized for sending offerings, illustrating Japan’s complex relationship with its uncomfortable past.
Unsurprisingly, these results demonstrate resistance to change in the island nation, where seniors form almost one-third of the population (and where said seniors, who voted the LDP into power when young, vote more per capita than youngsters do today. Not to mention the overrepresentation of rural regions, where the young have often nearly disappeared.) Though the LDP faced criticism from the public for its holding of the Tokyo Olympics during a surge in COVID cases, it held steady and markets have responded with confidence that, yes, Japan will endure. Kishida himself is evidence of this stability: the former Foreign Minister’s father and grandfather were politicians too, and he has served in Parliament since 1993, representing the city of Hiroshima. It seems that, after three decades, his ambitions for his nation’s highest post have materialized. Since his term has barely started, there is little telling where his tenure will go, but for the good of Japan, it will hopefully be better than Suga’s.
In the meantime, let us talk about Japan’s political parties, or at least those who garnered at least ten seats in this year’s race, with a mention of two of the other contenders:
Liberal Democratic Party (261, around 56 percent): Despite losing 15 seats since 2017, the party’s clear dominance of Japanese politics continues. The party can be regarded as the founder of modern Japan, having formed in 1955 and governing continuously until 1993. This era saw the post-war miracle take off in Japan and gave the world the bullet trains and anime for which the country has become renowned. It regained power in the mid 1990s and held it until 2009, when for a period of four years the House came under the control of the Democratic Party (a party which, fortunately for the Liberal Democrats, no longer exists.) With a number of right-of-center predecessors, the modern conservative party originates from the merger of the post-war Liberal and Progressive (later Democratic) parties, which were similarly neither liberal nor progressive. During the Cold War they served as the main pro-American party in Japan, in opposition to rival Socialists and Communists. They have weathered everything from protests in 1960 to an opposition government in 1993 from which they secured crucial defections, with the latter being especially notable due to its occurrence right as Japan was suffering a decade-long period of recession thanks to a housing market crash. A traditionally free-market party, its connections to party bosses leave its members with any ideology from actual liberalism in some cases to far-right ultranationalism. (Abe’s Nippon Kaigi bloc exemplifies the latter with an emphasis on militarism and traditionalism.) With a shift away from supporting concessions to rural communities, its support base has been gradually moving to the cities, although rural areas remain its true stronghold.
Constitutional Democratic Party (96, 21 percent): Down 13 or so seats from before, it is the center-left heir to the Democrats, and, like them, is defined by little more than generic opposition to the policies of the Liberal Democrats, such as their controversial attempts to remilitarize in violation of Japan’s Article 9. Liberals, conservatives, and moderate socialists all have a home in this party, essentially forming a big tent composed of more motivated anti-Kishida voters, though they are clearly not destined to form a new government anytime soon.
Innovation Party (41.9 percent): Up thirty seats, this right-wing party which supports visits to the Yasukuni Shrine has swollen from obscurity to dominance over the western city of Osaka. Being opposed to centralization, they are seen as the third option for voters disillusioned with both “Democratic” parties. Hirofumi Yoshimura, the young and passionate Governor of Osaka, has done much to rally voters to the cause, taking a more hawkish line on national defense while creatively aiming to generate income through casinos. Fortunately, unlike some other right-wing populist parties, it has supported pandemic-era restrictions, giving it credibility in the mask-trusting country, and has campaigned to make hate speech against minorities, such as Koreans, illegal.
What a young and sprightly fellow the Governor of Osaka (left) is. Sadly for his party, the electorate is not dominated by the young and sprightly. (Wikimedia Commons)
Komeito Party (32, 7 percent): Up only three seats, its consistent base of support speaks to its founding as an outlet for the Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist movement following Saint Nichiren. Advocating “humanitarian socialism” and naming itself “Clean Government,” it is not particularly pro-American, but it still supports the government. Why? Shared traditional values.
Communist Party (10, 2 percent): Despite their name, they dislike the Chinese government just as much as the other parties do–if not more. Though attacked by the Liberal Democrats as extremist and even as a threat to national security, they have actually formed an alliance with the Constitutional Democrats, and their electorate is for the most part aging (costing them two seats since 2017.) They support gender equality and are staunchly pacifist, opposing even nuclear power, and are not exactly in favor of American bases on Japanese soil.
Reiwa Shinsengumi (3, 1 percent): A small leftist party led by the former actor Taro Yamamoto, their biggest claim to fame is that their two upper house legislators, Eiko Kimura and Yasuhiko Funago, have become the first two severely disabled Japanese members of Parliament–the former with cerebral palsy, the latter with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. To them, recognizing the tremendous odds they have surmounted, we say congratulations!
Social Democratic Party (1, 0 percent): Once the largest opposition to the Liberal Democrats, regularly winning 20-30 percent of seats in the late 20th century and even providing two ephemeral Prime Ministers, this party last had influence in the 2009-2012 Democratic government and has not cracked ten seats since 2003.
The Japanese election system is best described as mixed: approximately five-eights of seats are apportioned through single-member districts where voters choose a candidate. The remainder are elected by proportional representation in 11 regions through closed lists, where voters choose a party instead of an individual candidate from that party and where the chosen candidates are selected by the party. Moreover, voters must write down the name of their choice, creating confusion when they write something that is not exactly correct.
African National Congress, or African National Catastrophe?
South Africa, Municipal - Nov 1
by Anthony Duan
Cyril Ramaphosa: heir to Mandela, or captain of a sinking ship? (Wikimedia Commons)
Monday’s local elections in South Africa not only saw support for the ruling African National Congress (ANC) fall below 50 percent for the first time since the end of Apartheid. Having been at the helm of the relatively industrialized, though highly unequal country for almost three decades, the ANC represented the freedom given to the country’s black majority by Nelson Mandela, leader of the party in decades past. Despite such achievements, its longstanding dominance meant that all of South Africa’s ills could be connected to it in one way or another: not only unemployment, but also corruption, the pandemic, and frequent blackouts due to mismanagement of the national energy company Eskom. Given these failures, their deputy secretary-general Jessie Duarte remarked that he “is not uncomfortable” with the results and sees “an opportunity to improve,” but with the ANC forced either out of power or into coalition governments in numerous localities, the question remains whether voters will be so forgiving.
The party remains dominant, having collected an estimated 46 percent of the popular vote, though that number stands in stark contrast to the 70 percent that they received in 2006. Nevertheless, it is much more powerful than any other individual party, with the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) receiving only half as many votes at 23 percent and a group of Marxists led by maverick Julius Malema - the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) - taking 10 percent. Neither seems likely to reach the first place spot anytime soon, with the DA perceived as a party for the white community - which at only 10 percent of the population and still privileged by the legacy of apartheid is unpalatable as a ruling clique to many South Africans of color - and the EFF, being Marxist, being seen as too radical.
In the end, those in power may not change: despite being the two largest parties and traditional rivals, the ANC and DA have had to consider forming a coalition to ensure that the EFF, which the DA refuses to work with, does not enter local governments. Accepting this new coalition reality, President Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the party that faces a possible unseating in next year’s leadership elections, has promised pragmatism while encouraging party leaders to “put aside [their] differences.” Indeed, with percentages in the high 30s for Johannesburg, the country’s largest city, and Pretoria, one of its three capitals, the ANC will find it not too difficult to claim a leading role with the pluralities it has won, and the DA, with more than 20 percent of the vote in each, will be in theory a simple partner to take on in governance, if not for the fact that the two are longtime rivals (They also failed to win a majority of votes in former President and current inmate Jacob Zuma’s home province of Kwazulu-Natal – perhaps an act of revenge by his supporters for permitting his prosecution).
(Update: the DA has refused to enter coalitions with the ANC and EFF due to them not holding “similar values.” Apparently, they are content to leave it up to the left-of-center parties to try to cobble something together now.)
Historically, while the DA had garnered support from the Western Cape (seat of Cape Town), the ANC held most of the rest of the country (though the ANC administration has retained its control over South Africa’s third capital, Bloemfontein, but with only 51 percent). Many “hung” administrations, where no majority exists, are forming in areas once steadfastly loyal to the two big players, but support for the country’s minor parties, buoyed by the proportional representation system in place, is present as well; the ethnically Zulu IFP, heir to Shaka’s legacy, took 6 percent; the Afrikaner Freedom Front Plus 2 percent, and the anti-immigrant ActionSA 2 percent (a figure which rose 17 percent later). These parties are unlikely to win due to their small ethnic and regional bases, but in a situation where no party holds a majority, they could take on an outsized role by making or breaking coalitions.
The elections arrive on the heels of summertime violence stemming from the sentencing of former President Jacob Zuma for contempt of court regarding corruption allegations, which devastated the country. With hundreds killed, local entrepreneurs reported losing the entirety of their assets, even to the point of being stripped of their plumbing and electricity. Though regional ANC officials condemned the riots as “deliberately orchestrated” and “an insurrection,” these public statements came too late for local residents to forgive the government for its apparent neglect of duty. Local Indians declared the scene a “war zone” as racial tensions centered in the city of Durban, where most of their minority community is concentrated, helped fuel the violence. The riots did not help; many racially-defined local communities, left segregated by Apartheid, engaged in routine and vigilante profiling of outsiders, allowing members of their own racial group to enter and threatening to kill members of other groups after vicious beatings. Adding to the tragedy, organizers of these vigilantes have reported being killed at the checkpoints they man, so in a vicious cycle, the tensions have done everything but cease. With so many South Africans losing faith in their own countrymen, it is no surprise that the party in power is suffering.
Even when riots are not occurring, the general quality of life in South Africa is far from comfortable, with up to fifty days a year spent without electricity as Eskom, the ANC-run national power company, responds to overloading by cutting power. With over a third of power plants idle due to mismanagement, and with President Ramaphosa predicting that reliable power will only come in five years, the status quo has clearly negative effects on the average South African’s day-to-day life. Who will be blamed? The ANC, which is not even a principled force due to members literally murdering one another for coveted offices (and presumably, opportunities at self-enrichment).
The electoral system used for local elections in South Africa is a modified form of proportional representation known as mixed-member proportional representation, where one-half of seats are elected from single-member wards and the remaining half are chosen from party lists with the intent of achieving overall proportionality. Voters cast two separate ballots, and in non-metropolitan areas, they additionally cast a proportional ballot for their “district” (regional) council. Lists are closed, so there is no opportunity to select a specific candidate on the ballot and the party will accordingly supply their members in a predetermined order. While independent candidates may run, this system unsurprisingly lends itself to strong political party bosses and weak individual candidates.
The African National Congress (ANC) has been in power since the end of Apartheid and racial segregation, having been elected in 1994 and re-elected on every occasion since then. At times, it fought an armed struggle against the white minority-dominated government under its “uMkhonto wa Size” (MK, or Spear of the Nation), an era which saw harsh repression from Nelson Mandela’s sentence at the Rivonia Trial to the murder of 600 demonstrators in the Soweto uprising. Even after apartheid, the party, founded in 1912, would gain support continuously until 2004. As of the 2019 provincial elections, the party still commands every province save the DA’s domain of the Western Cape, though it has been weakening due to controversies over corruption, as well as factional conflicts between its current and former Presidents. Essentially a big tent party representing the black Africans it freed under Mandela, the ANC claims a moderate socialist ideology in tandem with such parties as Denmark’s Social Democrats and the UK’s Laborites.
The main opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), was once known as the Democratic Party during the days of apartheid, under which it constituted the main opposition to that racist system. The longtime rival of the ANC, it has been losing support even in its own home base, the Western Cape, and has now fallen in third place in some provinces behind even the EFF. Why? Ironically, former leader Mmusi Maimane was the only black African to ever lead the party, unsurprisingly leading to criticism that it is essentially a party for the minority whose dominance it once fought to end. Its efforts now being focused on white and other minorities, and former leader Helen Zille’s controversial statements, have made it the target of fierce criticism from blacks who may not like the ANC, but also dislike a seeming lack of concern from this party.
The second opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), split from the ANC in 2013, and with a “radical leftist,” “anti-capitalist,” and “anti-imperialist” official ideology, is not difficult to place on the political spectrum. It holds official opposition (second largest party to the ANC) status in 3 provinces, having won votes on a promise to end corruption and nationalize mines. Its leader, Julius Malema, is viewed with suspicion by South Africa’s white community for demanding that their farms be seized sans compensation (due to lasting unemployment and poverty among the black majority as a consequence of apartheid) and for once stating that he has “not called for the killing of white people, at least for now.”
The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) represents the Zulus of eastern South Africa, and constitutes the official opposition in a single province: Kwazulu-Natal. Though anti-apartheid, it and the ANC competed for support among the Zulu base, a base who the latter has gradually been whittling away.
The Freedom Front Plus (FF+) was before 2016 primarily a campaign base for the concept of Afrikaner self-determination under an autonomous Volkstaat, but has since then expanded to advocate for other minorities (i.e. non-blacks). Its supporters are mostly white and coloured (mixed-race) South Africans, and its campaign issues include stopping killings of farmers, as well as lifting affirmative action quotas (such as how coloreds could not receive more than 1 of 11 promotions in the prison services.)
The ActionSA Party receives the most support from cities in the Gauteng province such as Pretoria (Tshwane) and Johannesburg, where it draws support from the ANC and considers itself more of a DA ally, through criticizing the latter for racist elements. Buoyed by residents in poor black townships hopeful for an end to poverty, its leader Herman Mashaba has vigorously condemned illegal immigration, though not out of prejudice but rather in an aim to solve the country’s tremendous unemployment.
Third Time’s The Charm? Bulgaria Is In An Uncertain Match… And It Isn’t Quidditch
Bulgaria, General - Nov 14
by Anthony Duan
For many Americans, the extent of our knowledge of Bulgaria has been learned through the lens of Harry Potter, in which the home country of Viktor Krum was depicted as dark and mysterious. The reality, however, is a bit more mundane. The country, located in the Balkans, is better known for corruption than dark magic, resulting in numerous calls for elections. This Monday saw citizens of the small nation elect a new Parliament for the third time this year (yes, you read that correctly!), as the previous two elections failed to produce a workable government. The country, which is also the poorest in the entire European Union, is also in the process of electing a new President. However, the failure to produce a working government is far from the only issue plaguing the country: less than a quarter of Bulgarians have been vaccinated against COVID-19 (again, placing the country at the bottom of the EU), and the President and Prime Minister were… at odds, to say the least.
The current Bulgarian President, Rumen Radev, is a noted critic of former Premier, Boyko Borisov. Radev won 49.4 percent of the votes in the Presidential race, but, given the requirement for winning the Presidency is 50 percent of the vote, there will be a runoff election next week.
Speaking of Borisov, massive protests broke out last year after the former bodyguard’s government ordered raids on several of Radev’s officials -- including the anti-corruption and legal affairs secretaries -- and many Bulgarians believe the purpose to have been to stymie investigations into the oligarchy. Radev responded by calling on the people to “purge the mafia,” (with the ‘mafia’ being Borisov), and protesting crowds concurred. As Bulgaria is the most corrupt country in the EU, it was ironic that Radev failed to block Borisov’s appointment of Ivan Geshev as Chief Prosecutor, given that Gershev ordered the raids.
With over 90 percent of votes counted, a centrist party known as We Continue the Change (PP) is leading in the polls with around a quarter of the votes after running on an anti-corruption platform – despite the party being only two months old. Borisov’s center-right party, GERB, won around 22 percent of the vote, finishing second. Although only 40n percent of voters voted, those who did fulfill their civic duty reported that efforts to stop graft and raise living standards were at the top of their minds.
One former minister in the current interim government - albeit one facing suspicion for apparently holding Canadian citizenship as well as Bulgarian (an offense for a serving Minister) - is the Harvard-educated Kiril Petkov. As one of the co-leaders of the PP, along with hopeful Finance Minister Assen Vassilev (also a Crimson alum), he is expected to be the country’s next Prime Minister, running on a platform that advocates for greater funding for education and healthcare. Given that this platform has only garnered the support of one-quarter of voters, the process of coalition-building will be a long and arduous one. Petkov and Vassilev are also insisting on anti-corruption and judicial reform measures as a basic precondition for negotiations. A proud Petkov has already declared; “Bulgaria is starting out on a new road.”
Now, what exactly happened in July? Another upstart party, “There Is Such a People,” (ITN) “won” the July elections, also with only one-quarter of the vote. Why did they fail? Their leader, a singer named Slavi Trifonov, announced his proposed government the day after the election despite having pre-recorded the video beforehand. He chose not to seek the support of the anti-corruption parties that were similarly opposed to Borisov, and, in return, they gave him no support. Even worse, he tried to negotiate with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), a party notorious both for pandering to ethnic Turkish voters and (far more importantly) for its massive corruption, affecting both its leader Ahmed Dogan and its Prime Ministerial candidate (and U.S-sanctioned oligarch) Delyan Peevski. The President was so desperate to form a government that he asked the Socialists -- the third-largest party in Bulgaria, with only 15 percent of the 240 seats in Parliament -- in a last-ditch attempt to avoid a third election. Needless to say, he failed.
By result, ITN is bleeding support, although they are expected to join Petkov’s Coalition government along with “Democratic Bulgaria,” the Socialists, and, obviously, PP. The Socialists are descendants of the old ruling Communists, so their inclusion in a government of reformists may be seen as strange, yet all these parties find an enemy in Borisov. PP, however, is not without its challenges; its leaders lack experience, its only credentials are those of a literal protest party against Borisov, and, while it does not polarize the country between left and right, its actual performance is yet to be seen. Nonetheless, President Radev declared that the vote would decide “whether the process of consolidating statehood would continue or those acting from behind the scenes will regain institutional power,” in an unsubtle jab at Borisov.
By the way, in case you noticed, Borisov is indeed a former bodyguard, having protected both former Communist dictator Todor Zhivkov - reviled for his brutal assimilation campaign against the country’s Turkish minority - and former King (and Prime Minister) Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
So, for a quick rundown of the parties at play here, we have We Continue the Change (PP, 67 seats), a centrist party of anti-corruption reformists and the favorites to form a new government, led by Harvard graduates. After them comes GERB (long name Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, 59 seats), whose name means shield, but which has not been able to shield itself from corruption allegations and which led the previous interim government. Then we have DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms), whose 34 seats give both the Turkish minority and oligarchs a voice. Formerly-communist and Borisov-hating Socialists receive 26 seats, while two smaller anti-corruption parties, There is Such a People - the party led by a singer who thought he could govern alone despite only having one-quarter of the vote – with 25 seats and Democratic Bulgaria with 16 almost complete the set. Who’s at the end - specifically, the far-right end? Revival. Their main political role is to form a nationalist faction, and they are expected to have little to no relevance in the Parliament-to-be.
Speaking of the Parliament, each term lasts for four years, and the electoral system is a simple form of proportional representation. The country is divided between 31 districts, given 4 to 16 seats each, and, within each district, seats are allocated from open lists. In this system, voters mark their preferences for a specific candidate on a party list, providing the potential to modify the order of said list. A 4 percent threshold for entry is applied, but that percentage is calculated nationally.
MI PRESIDENTE, JOSE ANTONIO KAST? -- CHILE MULLS ITS FREE MARKET
Chile, General - Nov 21
by Anthony Duan
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You can mess with a lot of things, but don’t mess with a Chilean’s subway ticket (Wikimedia Commons)
Update: As of the second round’s passing, Boric has defeated Kast with over five-ninths of the total vote, with pride flags and other progressive symbols flown to celebrate his victory as the defeated right-winger, apparently proving his support for democracy, concedes and wishes the President-elect “respect and constructive collaboration.” It is safe to assume that unlike 1973, when Socialist President Salvador Allende was overthrown, there will be no storming of the Moneda Palace, nor will there be any shaman finding himself the center of an insurrection.
Dear readers, I am saddened to inform you of Chile’s failure to select a President in the first round of its national elections, but I am even more saddened to tell you of the frontrunner: Jose Antonio Kast, who has declared his support for former dictator Augusto Pinochet (yes, the War-era dictator known for disappearing his opponents.) In some ways the election resembles an American culture war, with Kast campaigning on the ticket of a party he has literally named the Republican Party, promising less bureaucracy and a harder line on crime, using references to “liberty” as a slogan, and being supported by quite a few citizens wearing MAGA caps. His opponent Gabriel Boric is no old moderate like Clinton nor Biden, but rather a young former-student activist defined as a feminist, green, and progressive – the ideological descendant of Pinochet’s victims. We should probably remember that Kast could easily win, as his emphasis on crime and immigration, as well as the economy, is likely to appeal to voters who desire lower prices and greater public safety. Boric is no fascist, but many Chileans view his ideas as impractical, and being painted as a “communist” by the “peace and freedom”-embracing Kast is not doing him any favors.
Chilean centrists collapsed in the polls because Santiago’s subway fares increased by 4 percent – equal to 4 cents – in 2019. Chile’s students were furious, and responded by first jumping the turnstiles, and then by looting supermarkets, rioting, and torching no fewer than 22 metro stations. After all, despite being Latin America’s most developed nation, the country is the world’s third-most-unequal, with half of Chileans making less than $550 a month, and its insistence on free-markets (another legacy of Pinochet) has led to less-than-stellar schools, hospitals, and pensions. Hundreds of thousands marched through Santiago declaring that “we have gone to the streets to ask for our dignity,” students especially furious over having to pay the world’s highest college tuitions and the consequent massive levels of debt (not to mention the privatized water, guaranteed by Pinochet’s Constitution, which was never repealed despite the dictatorship’s end three decades ago). In a move reminiscent of Pinochet’s regime, the center-right President Sebastian Pinera responded by imposing a curfew and sending in 20,000 troops, which only aggravated the conflict. Some violence followed, and even as he tried to restore normalcy, Pinera saw his approval rating plummet to a dismal 14 percent.
Chile is currently rewriting its Constitution under the aegis of a Convention called for that purpose after the 2019 violence. Consisting of 155 members, 17 representing Chile’s indigenous peoples and with gender parity, the somewhat-revolutionary Convention has until this coming January to submit a document to the judgment of the people, who may approve or reject it. There is fear that they may be ineffectual, but also that they will give a voice to the Mapuche natives, who have for the past decades been embroiled in an increasingly-violent conflict with loggers on their traditional lands. The “social outburst” of the protests exists in tandem with the Mapuche movement, and Elisa Loncon, a Mapuche herself, has been elected President of the Convention, the first indigenous Chilean to ever reach such a high national position. Of course, how much of a “refoundation” Chile will find in economic and social fields depends on the relative power of left and right, with the latter still sympathetic to the Pinochet-era constitution, and the leftist victory Loncon’s Convention seemed to promise may be short-lived if Kast’s dreams come true.
Considering that their choice will be between a brazen right-winger and an also-brazen (if somewhat less extreme) leftist, Chileans may “end up voting against certain policies, rather than in favor of what they actually want.” The American parallels continue. The Communists have indeed stood on Boric’s side since he defeated their preferred candidate, the Santiago-area mayor Daniel Jadue, in a surprise primary upset, although he is simultaneously trying to reach out to centrists with his message that “hope wins over fear” ahead of the December 19th runoffs. The 35-year old Boric, an opponent of Chile’s inequality and tuition fees, has demanded that Chile be the “grave” of its neoliberal (i.e. free-market) economic model. In true Bernie Sanders fashion, Boric, having served as a Congressman since 2014 representing the far south, calls for taxes to be raised on the “ultra-rich” and for a “green recovery” from the pandemic. Kast is in the lead by a slim 2 percent margin (28 percent vs 26 percent, albeit with a fairly low turnout of around 40 percent), and continues to stand by the free market, as well as the Christian right’s opposition to same-sex marriage and abortion – perhaps unsurprising, given his ticket’s name of the “Christian Social Front.” While not so much an intellectual as the law student Boric, he is reputed for his down-to-earth attitude and emphasis on unconventional policy proposals, such as using a three-meter ditch to stop illegal immigration, which have earned him the American-inspired nickname KKK Kast. Unfriendly monikers notwithstanding, both campaigns have been energized by their first-round victories. With the runoff set to be extremely competitive, a disappointed center-left Yasna Provoste and center-right Sebastian Sichel are somewhat reluctantly throwing their support to Boric and Kast respectively, both seeing the other as too extreme.
Chile faces a stark choice indeed: on the one hand they may vote to confirm the objectives and mission of a leftist social movement that has destabilized a country that has so long favored an elite few, or they may choose another Trump or Bolsonaro figure, standing for stability in a country that desperately seeks some solution to ongoing unrest. Social justice with Boric, or a firm rule of law with Kast? The decision is not so simple.
The Chilean presidential election system functions with two rounds, where 50 percent of the vote is required to win in either, and where the second round sees the top two contenders from the first face off. A term lasts four years, and terms may not be served consecutively. As for Congress, the system used was formerly an unusual variant of open-list proportional representation, where voters could select a preferred candidate from their preferred list and where candidates with more preference votes ranked higher. Every district had two seats, favoring the pro-Pinochet right-wing “Alliance” and leaving “third alliances” -- parties outside of either the Alliance or the center-left anti-Pinochet “Concert” -- unrepresented. As an alliance would need to win twice as many votes as any other to capture both seats, the “binomial” system enforced approximate two-party parity. Congress has since transitioned to a “normal” proportional representation system, albeit with the Senate elected in halves due to terms lasting eight years.
Before Boric’s and Kast’s election, Chile once maintained a stable system, with right-wing Liberals and Conservatives (merging into the Nationals), centrist Christian Democrats (replacing the Radicals), and left-wing Communists and Socialists, whose coming to power under Salvador Allende’s “Popular Unity” led to the dictatorship of the 70s and 80s after Pinochet seized power through a reactionary coup. The modern left retains the Communists and Socialists, though the Socialists have moved towards more moderate alliances with the Party for Democracy -- essentially a centrist partner they set up -- and even the Christian Democrats, their old rivals. On the right, the National Party has been replaced by the National Renewal, opposed more or less to both Pinochet and Allende, and with a base of rural folk and small businessmen. Their partner, the Independent Democratic Union, was explicitly pro-Pinochet, and draws on the support of the middle class and entrepreneurs who approved of his legacy. While none of these parties will provide the President, these traditional “centrist” (as opposed to the “extremist” Kast and Boric) groupings will nonetheless influence the selection of the ultimate victor, as the rightists have signaled Kast as their lesser evil, and for everyone else, that lesser evil is Boric.
BLACKOUT IN THE HOMELAND
Kyrgyzstan, Parliamentary - Nov 28
by Anthony Duan
Though everybody’s favorite Central Asian country may be Borat’s homeland of Kazakhstan, the country’s smaller neighbor Kyrgyzstan recently held parliamentary elections with even more comical results.
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has threatened to make election officials answer for a blackout with their heads, and it’s not surprising to see why he’s so upset: a party allied with his government, Ata-Jurt (Homeland) Kyrgyzstan, was set to receive 30 percent of the vote, but walked away from the blackout with a startlingly low 16 percent. At one point, likely-hacked results suggested a 150 percent turnout – ironic, considering that only around 35 percent of Kyrgyz cast ballots. The country’s Election Commission is trying to find an explanation for what may be something as innocuous as a simple monitor error or as sinister as interference that would throw all the results so far (70 percent of votes having been counted) into jeopardy —insofar as two of the 36 districts voting against all candidates and requiring a new election anyway was not already a sign of disillusionment. A number of opposition parties found themselves below the threshold, and a number of other pro-government parties lost votes, if not enough to put them under the five percent threshold.
It should be noted that Japarov is quite an interesting character. Sentenced to over a decade in prison for kidnapping a government official he disliked, he was freed by protesters last year during Kyrgyzstan’s third overthrow of a government since the collapse of the USSR. After having his conviction overturned, he won 79 percent of the vote on a pledge to bring jobs back to the country and good old brute-force patriotism. Accusations of authoritarianism abound.
Opposition parties are crying fraud, with the opposition Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party calling for a complete annulment of the results and saying that doing so “is necessary to maintain stability.” While elections were reported as “competitive” and “well organized” by Danish observer Peter Juel-Jensen, he did not hesitate to point out irregularities in the vote count, possibly giving credence to Ata-Meken’s claims. In fact, this election is in itself a repeat of last year’s vote, which was discounted due to supposed fraud, after which protests elevated Japarov to the Presidency. Hopefully, however, the people support his government, as the three top-ranking parties in the admittedly-disputed vote count all support the administration.
Japarov himself is not innocent from claims of dictatorship; having passed a new Constitution which grants him powers such as appointing judges, it cannot be denied that he is centralizing authority in his own hands. What that means remains to be seen, but considering that an opposition leader has already been assaulted and that 15 people have been arrested–supposedly with drugs–for an alleged coup plot, the country’s democracy is not exactly in a healthy state.
Considering that Kyrgyz politics is mostly a matter of Japarov against his enemies, I believe that there is little to really go over in terms of the details. However, for the sake of clarity: of the 54 seats decided by parties’ proportional representation results, the top three parties–Fatherland Kyrgyzstan, Harmony, and Trust–have each received more than 10 percent of the vote and are set to receive around 36 seats collectively, and the more religious Light of Faith Party, also pro-government, came in sixth, the final place above the threshold. The opposition Alliance and United Kyrgyzstan parties made it into Parliament, but have less votes combined than Fatherland Kyrgyzstan. With a number of pro-Japarov candidates winning in the winner-take-all districts, the President should have no trouble securing a majority.
The Parliament, having been reduced from its previous 120 seats to a lesser 90, is elected through two different methods. Fifty-four seats are elected from national party lists with the aforementioned five percent system and proportional representation, while 36 are chosen in single-member districts. Early results portend mostly to the proportional seats, which are selected from open lists, meaning that candidates given preferential votes by the electorate rise to the top of the list.
