An Analysis of Electoral Politics in the Caucasus

A streetscape in Stepanakert, the capital of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic which was invaded by Azerbaijan in September 2023 (Clay Gilliland on Flickr)

With the recent Azerbaijani invasion of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic—also known as Artsakh—and expulsion of most of its people to Armenia, international attention has focused on Artsakh President Samvel Shakhramanyan, and his order to dissolve the region’s government by January 1, 2024. This will make for a short term, as Shakhramanyan was elected by the National Assembly of Artsakh on September 9, a mere week and a half before Azerbaijan’s September 19 attack.

Breakaway states sometimes reflect the political institutions of their benefactors, such as the Russian puppet state of Transnistria in Moldova, where the leader of the opposition Communist Party was suspiciously shot in his home. However, the national aspirations of the South Caucasus have created a situation where, in spite of autocratic neighbors, breakaway states are able to enjoy some form of self-rule. Russian-supported South Ossetia’s incumbent president was defeated in May 2022 by the leader of a small opposition party, despite both appearing to support Moscow and unification with North Ossetia, a Russian republic. In nearby Abkhazia, also a Russian client state in Georgia’s internationally-recognized territory, parliamentary elections in March 2022 were competitive, with about half of the seats being filled in the second round due to no clear majority earlier. This did not hinder locals from complaining about the heavy influence of pork-barrel politics and the victories of pro-government newcomers, but the openness with which Abkhazians have criticized the results demonstrates a notably greater degree of political freedom than in neighboring Russia.

Likewise, during its short life, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic gradually evolved its political institutions while maintaining political stability with regular elections and a multitude of political parties. Its final general elections, held in March 2020, gave no single party a majority in the legislature and required a second round for the presidential ballot, indicating democratic maturation and competitive elections. 

Though the Free Motherland party retained its dominant position, it lost its absolute majority in the National Assembly, while some parties like United Homeland rose and others such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation saw their support nearly collapse. Political dynamism is not new to the small former republic. In 2009, Freedom House reported that “partially-free” Nagorno-Karabakh was marginally freer than Armenia and significantly freer than “not free” Azerbaijan.

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have struggled with political instability and repression. As recently as 2021, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has accused the “Karabakh clan” of his predecessors, native to the disputed region, of attempting a coup, while he himself came to power in the so-called “Velvet Revolution” of 2018. Nonetheless, and despite criticism of his handling of the prior Azerbaijani victory in a 2020 war, many Armenians regard Pashinyan as a democratic bulwark in contrast to former leaders like ex-President Serzh Sargsyan, who has faced charges of corruption. Armenia also suffered an era of instability throughout the early 2000s following a mass shooting in Parliament in 1999, featuring flawed presidential elections in 2003 and a rigged constitutional referendum in 2005. 

Democracy has fared even worse in Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev won a fourth term with 86 percent of the vote in an election marred by accusations of impropriety, with observers stating that “the rule of law is not observed” and “laws curtail fundamental rights and freedoms.” The Aliyev family has dominated Azerbaijan’s politics, with Ilham’s father Heydar having served in high posts of the Azerbaijan SSR and as a post-independence Azerbaijani president. Ilham Aliyev, who appointed his wife vice president, has maintained power by catering to his supporters’ anti-Armenian sentiments. When the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe released its report critical of Azerbaijan’s elections, many shouted that their “report is designed to please Armenians.” It is little wonder, then, that the ethnic Armenians of Azerbaijan-occupied Nagorno-Karabakh had meager faith in the promises of their new overlord.