September 30 Parliamentary Election: A Critical Point for Slovakia to Reshape its International Standing on EU-Russia Relations

Former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico at the European Council summit (Wikimedia Commons)

With the left-wing, populist Slovak Social Democracy (SMER) party leading in the polls ahead of Slovakia’s September 30 parliamentary election, European observers are increasingly concerned at the prospect of a new pro-Russian Slovak government that could jeopardize unity within the EU and NATO.

Thanks to a December 2022 no-confidence vote that toppled the four-party majority coalition government, the Slovak people will be responsible for choosing 150 members of the National Council in an early election on September 30. Slovakia uses a system of proportional representation in which parties need to earn at least five percent of the vote to win seats in the council. If no party wins over 50 percent of the vote, the party receiving the most votes must form a coalition. 

The opposition party SMER-SSF, headed by former Prime Minister Robert Fico, has maintained a slight lead over Progressive Slovakia (PS), headed by Michal Šimečka. Fico’s strong poll numbers have unsettled EU and NATO members, who worry his victory might mean a Slovakia that is sympathetic to Russia.

“We are a peaceful country. We will not send a single round to Ukraine,” said Fico at a political rally. Fico has openly criticized sanctions against Russia and laid out a plan of rapprochement after the war. He has also pledged to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and accused the West of provoking Russia, a sharp contrast to Slovakia’s current pro-Ukraine policies. 

Fico’s pro-Russian campaign may reflect growing ambivalence toward the war in Ukraine. According to a survey administered by GLOBSEC Trends 2023, 34 percent of Slovaks blame the West for provoking Russia, with 17 percent accusing Ukraine of oppressing the Russian-speaking population. 

Some attribute Slovakia’s increasing pro-Russian trend to a Russian disinformation campaign. As Matej Kandrík of the Strategic Policy Institute points out, Russia has continued to undermine Slovak-EU relations by exploiting “a shared communist past, the conservatism of Slovak society, the common Slavic ethnic background or the country’s economic dependence on Russian gas and oil to spread their narratives in Slovakia.”

The intensifying energy crisis and rising energy costs are major drivers of increasing skepticism of the West. Since the war broke out, Russian oil exports have plummeted, inflicting a huge blow to Slovak households and industry. Slovakia imported 85 percent of its natural gas and approximately 100 percent of its crude oil from Russia before the conflict. As energy supplies drop and prices continue to rise, the Slovak Regulatory Office for Network Industries finds that nearly one in four Slovak households live in energy poverty. 

By diversifying its energy sources, obtaining an exemption from EU sanctions on Russia, and receiving financial assistance to help its companies transition to alternative energy sources, Slovakia’s energy prices have dropped roughly 80 percent from the peak of the crisis in late 2022. Still, insecure energy supplies and fluctuating prices remain top concerns for voters, which right-wing politicians have tied to the West’s interference with the Russian-Ukrainian War.

As openness towards Moscow steadily increases among the Slovak public, the September election outcome could lead to a seismic shift in the Slovak government’s Ukraine policies.

Until now, Bratislava has sent weapons to and showcased strong political support for Ukraine. If Fico’s party takes control of parliament, they could start vetoing policies to impede EU and NATO decision-making. However, some observers argue that Fico would take a more practical approach if elected. Indeed, he has a track record of reneging on campaign promises for practical purposes in previous terms.

If the SMER beats Progressive Slovakia as polls predict, it will likely have to form a coalition with one of the smaller parties, many of which take a more hostile stance toward Russia. 

SMER’s lead remains narrow, and even if elected, it is unlikely Slovakia would sever ties and halt all support for Ukraine. However, the shift in public view and its reflection in the political arena signals the country’s divergence from the collective European stance on Ukraine and the future direction of EU-Russia relations.