Former Chinese Communist Party Premier Li Keqiang Dies at Age 68
Li Keqiang discusses urbanization at a conference with Friends of Europe. | Source: Friends of Europe
Li Keqiang, who served as the premier of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 2013 to 2023 and advocated for a “people’s China,” died on October 27, 2023 at the age of 68. Li was well known for championing “Likonomics,” an approach that aimed to reduce debt, end ineffective stimulus practices, and boost Chinese economic growth.
China Central Television (CCTV) broadcasted an announcement shortly after Li’s death. “Comrade Li Keqiang, while resting in Shanghai in recent days, experienced a sudden heart attack on October 26 and after all-out efforts to revive him failed, died in Shanghai at ten minutes past midnight on October 27,” CCTV reported on October 27.
Born in 1955, Li grew up in the Anhui province and joined the CCP in 1976 as Secretary of the Commune Branch. After graduating with a law degree from Peking University in 1982, he joined the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), gradually rising through the ranks in the next two decades. Li developed a close friendship with CCYL leader Hu Jintao, who would become president of China in 2012.
As vice premier in 2008, Li was deemed one of the most eligible contenders to succeed Hu’s presidency. Instead, Xi Jinping, who had served as Hu’s vice chairman on the Central Military Commission since 2010, was chosen for the position. Li’s goals as vice premier, which remained consistent throughout his career, included reducing the wealth gap between China’s “cities and coastal regions” and the “rural areas and central and western regions,” as he expressed in a speech at the 2010 Davos Forum.
Elected on March 15, 2013, Li served as premier of the CCP for ten years, second only to Chinese President Xi Jinping. He retired after ten years in March 2023, just seven months before his death. As premier, Li’s Likonomics focused on reducing China’s reliance on exports and increasing economic growth through domestic consumption. His approach targeted three key areas: eliminating government stimulus, de-leveraging the economy to reduce national debt, and implementing market-based reforms through increased support of private businesses and entrepreneurs.
Li first called for ending fiscal stimulus, which caused firms to over-rely on government-directed investment and slowed economic growth. Second, de-leveraging aimed to lower China’s borrowing to output ratio—credit had grown to 190% of GDP—in order to reduce debt and cultivate productive investment. Third, market-based reforms—which Li claimed were the “biggest dividend” for China—that bolster the private sector would reduce the role of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese economy. In May 2013, Li suggested reforms to China’s cabinet in a State Council meeting, such as liberalizing interest rates and increasing utility prices. Likonomics would have unraveled the economic structure of the CCP, producing short-term risks for China’s exchange rate.
In the early years of his rule, many compared Li to former CCP chairman Deng Xiaoping, who introduced market reforms in China in the 1980s and encouraged foreign investment in a post-Mao economy. While Deng’s market-based approach led China in a direction of rapid economic growth—its nominal GDP placed second only to the United States—Likonomics failed to combat the increasingly statist CCP. Li’s idealistic goals were difficult to carry out under Xi’s plans to centralize the economy. Since 2013, Xi has exerted greater control over the private sector, expanded the influence of state-owned enterprises, and emphasized redistribution to promote common prosperity.
For some, the death of Li and Likonomics diminishes hopes of steering Chinese economic policy toward openness and reform. Old Dominion University professor Li Shaomin expressed the end of expectations that China would pursue economic policy encompassing “free speech, the rule of law, democracy and free markets.”
Various conspiracy theories expressed skepticism towards Li’s cause of death, pointing to the possibility of malicious involvement. Political commentator Wang Dan wrote in a Radio Free Asia commentary on November 6 that while such speculations may not be true, they have a large impact on the public’s perception of the CCP. “[These doubts] show a further deepening of the general public distrust of, and opposition to, Xi Jinping,” he declared.