Central Asia's Pragmatic Pivot From Russian Dependence

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and China are all part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (The Kremlin).

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both recently rejected furthering ties with Russia, with Kazakhstan deciding not to become a full member of BRICS on October 16 and Uzbekistan choosing not to enter the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russia-led trade bloc, on October 17, RFE/RL and The Diplomat report. Both countries say that they see no benefit to joining these organizations. This is somewhat surprising, as Central Asia has historically followed Moscow closely, especially through their membership in Russia-dominated organizations like the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was designed as a successor to the Soviet Union. These two decisions represent a larger regional trend of avoiding close commitment to Russia and in favor of greater economic freedom.

Economic ties with Russia have been decreasing across Central Asia. For example, the percentage of remittances from Russia flowing into Uzbekistan has decreased in the last year, according to Eurasianet, while there has been a rapid increase in remittances coming from other countries. Remittances from Europe and East Asia have increased, with remittances from South Korea increasing by 76 percent and remittances from the UK increasing by 49 percent. Remittances from Poland have more than doubled, and Meduza reports that the country has seen a rapid increase in the number of residency permits issued to Uzbekistanis since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

These decisions may be linked to growing economic ties between China and Central Asia. The Kazakhstani Prime Minister’s office recently announced that Kazakhstan signed a deal that would lead to $2.5 billion in investment from Chinese companies as part of their goal to double bilateral trade. Kyrgyzstan has also increased its trade with China, and is borrowing heavily from the Export-Import Bank of China, as reported by Eurasianet. Since trade with China is increasing, Kazakhstan declining to become a BRICS would not be due to China, but concern over Russia.

This decision does not mean that these countries are pulling away from Moscow entirely, merely that they are diversifying their diplomatic and economic options. Members of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2023 that Central Asian countries’ policy of working with many countries economically and distancing themselves from Russia in messaging shows that they are attempting to work with the growing power and economic sway of China while simultaneously avoiding being punished by the West for supporting Putin. Indeed, Central Asian states have been treading carefully around Western sanctions, not running afoul of them. Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated publicly that Kazakhstan would only follow sanctions if that was in its best interest, according to Bloomberg.

Notably, these countries still have close security ties to Russia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russia-led alliance. Article 4 of the treaty resembles NATO’s Article 5, mandating collective defense. Additionally, Foreign Policy reported that CSTO troops have been used to quell protests in Kazakhstan. Central Asian countries have also been turning to China for security in recent years. Kinga Szálkai, an assistant professor at the Eötvös Loránd University in Hungary, wrote in the CSIS blog that Chinese arms sales to Central Asia grew by 18 percent between 2016 and 2020, and says the concern over growing Chinese influence may drive the large Russian military commitments in the region.

While Central Asian countries are by no means becoming opposed to Russia, they are adopting a variety of economic and diplomatic ties in order to succeed in the changing geopolitical landscape.