ANALYSIS: Despite Predictions to the Contrary, Tanks Haven’t Gone the Way of the Battleship

Photos of destroyed Russian Armored Fighting Vehicles in Ukraine, such as this BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, are common. (Wikimedia Commons)

Until World War II, conventional wisdom stated that naval wars would be decided by a decisive confrontation between the combatant’s battleships. Therefore, naval arms limitation treaties such as the Washington Naval Treaty in the interwar years focused on limiting the number of battleships that could be made, leading to the famous 5:5:3 ratio of American, British, and Japanese battleships. World War II demonstrated that battleships could not defeat the long range of aircraft carriers, exemplified by the role of antiquated Swordfish torpedo bombers in the sinking of the Bismarck. By 1962, there were only four commissioned battleships in the world, all used as fire-support platforms by the U.S. Navy.

Rumors of My Death

Some analysts, including those featured in Foreign Policy Magazine and the Atlantic, argue that the same shift has occurred for another armored vehicle that has become more vulnerable in the modern battlefield: the tank. Elon Musk wrote on X in 2023 that “tanks are a deathtrap now. With neither side having air superiority, you’re left with infantry & artillery—essentially WW1.” Others cite the high casualties armored units have taken in Ukraine and eye-catching announcements such as the U.S. Marine Corps’s decision to no longer field the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank. However, most military analysts—including Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who defended the tank in a War on the Rocks piece, as well as the Army University Press—still stand by the tank. Nonetheless, it is important to weigh the utility and drawbacks of using armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) in modern warfare.

A major reason that AFVs have been struggling in current conflicts is that the most publicized recent conflicts—such as early fighting in Ukraine and most, if not all, of Israeli armored operations—have taken place in urban environments where armored warfare is notoriously difficult. That is especially true when those vehicles lack sufficient infantry support to deal with infantry-portable anti-tank weapons. One Hamas pamphlet advises fighters to approach near a tank to not give its active protection system time to react. Some casualties have also been caused by issues with armored doctrine. A lack of well-developed combined-force tactics, especially on the part of Russia, has led to increased casualties.

Disillusionment with AFVs can be attributed to critics not realizing that AFVs were never invulnerable. Tanks are designed to use their mobility and firepower to exploit breakthroughs or provide fire support, not to absorb punishment. The British learned this in the Western Desert through the failure of their Cruiser and Infantry tank doctrine; they designed lighter vehicles like the Crusader to exploit breakthroughs and slower, better armored vehicles like the Matilda to advance with their infantry. While it was difficult for German Panzer IIIs to penetrate the armor of infantry tanks at range, they were still vulnerable to the up-gunned Panzer IVs and 88mm anti-aircraft guns. No amount of armor can make a tank invulnerable, and the added weight of armor always comes at the cost of mobility, the true strength of AFVs.

A Brief Lesson in Tank Classification

It is important to understand that there are different types of AFVs. Soon after the development of the tank, many countries began to use a designation system of light, medium, and heavy tanks to differentiate the different designs and purposes of these vehicles. There were also vehicles known as armored personnel carriers, which carried no weapons larger than machine guns and had space for infantry, and tank destroyers, which often lacked turrets to allow them to carry larger guns to target other armored vehicles. A new vehicle, known as the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), has emerged as a cross between an armored personnel carrier and a light tank, carrying more firepower than the former but having less carrying space. 

As war speeds up and the armor-piercing power of munitions increases, IFVs and light tanks are becoming more useful. For example, the U.S. Army recently acquired a new light tank (although they call it a “Mobile Protected Firepower Vehicle”), the M10 Booker, to supplement their armored forces. Heavy tanks, however, are no longer in service in most militaries because they are large and slow targets whose thick armor is insufficient to protect them from modern anti-tank weapons. Unlike battleships, tanks are not obsolete; rather, they are adapting as naval warfare did as a whole during and after World War II, with militaries phasing out the slowest, largest, most vulnerable vehicles in favor of smaller vehicles that fully leverage new technologies.

When people talk about “tanks,” though, they are usually thinking of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) like the American M1 Abrams and German Leopard series, the successor to the medium tank. These large and relatively slow vehicles are the ones that have struggled to withstand swarming attacks by infantry or drones, especially when they lack sufficient technological upgrades. This is the problem facing the Soviet-era tanks that Russia has reactivated. 

Modern Problems, Modern Solutions

Although AFVs must confront new battlefield challenges, including increasingly effective infantry anti-tank weapons and drones, new technology can help them remain viable. Active protection systems that have been developed in the past 20-or-so years have proven to be highly effective in combating anti-tank missiles, according to reports by DefenseNews and Rafael, a defense systems company. As portable guided missile launchers such as the Javelin comprise the main infantry-borne threat to tanks, these technologies greatly enhance survivability. Active protection systems work by detecting the missile in flight, then launching a sensor-obscuring smoke grenade if they are “soft-kill” or firing an often-explosive projectile at the missile if they are “hard-kill.” 

The proliferation of drones is also a major challenge to AFVs, but one that affects all other aspects of the military as well. The Ukrainian military has substantially degraded the Russian Black Sea Fleet through drone attacks, and drones can just as easily target infantry. However, some technologies mitigate this issue for tanks. Active protection systems can work against single-use drones or the missiles from larger drones, though some, like the Israeli Trophy, may have blind spots directly above the tank or may not detect slow-moving projectiles. Multiple or simultaneous attacks can also overwhelm or deplete active protection systems. Drones are also still quite susceptible to jamming, though this is a rapidly evolving arms race. Companies like Northrop Grumman and Anduril are also developing new systems that utilize missiles, guns, or other drones to counter the emerging threat of drone warfare. 

A major reason for the efficacy of both guided missiles and drones is that they attack the top of the tank, which traditionally has less armor than the front or sides. One way to adapt is increasing armor on the roofs of AFVs and better separating engine compartments, which must have vents for exhaust, from the crew compartment to prevent the fire or shrapnel from spreading. While battleships were unable to adapt to over-the-horizon warfare because they could not carry more than a few aircraft, AFVs can improve their survivability through the use of new technologies. 

While tanks face new challenges on the modern battlefield, there are also new opportunities to improve their capabilities. The demand for mobile firepower has not gone away. It is vital for countries to understand this fact in order for their militaries to adapt to the wars of the future.