Somber, But Reinvigorated: The Russian Opposition in the Wake of Navalny’s Death
Protestors gather outside the Russian Embassy in Washington on February 23, 2024, marking the second anniversary of the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine (photo courtesy Kuzma Shepelev)
Alexei Navalny was the face of the Russian opposition for over a decade. He organized massive protests against Putin’s government and its corruption, led a presidential campaign in 2018, and continued to wield pronounced influence even after the Russian government jailed him on fabricated charges in 2021. His death in prison on February 16, which most members of the Russian opposition believe was a murder orchestrated by Putin and the Russian government, begs the question: where does the Russian opposition go from here?
Russian state media has consistently downplayed Navalny’s influence, and Putin notoriously refused to even say Navalny’s name. However, the 2020 poisoning of Navalny, his imprisonment, and ultimately his alleged killing all show that Putin viewed Navalny as a major threat to his power. Even after Navalny’s death, the Russian government continues to view him as a threat. Authorities detained over 400 people across over 35 cities for partaking in actions of remembrance of Navalny from February 16-18, many for simply leaving flowers or possessing portraits of Navalny. People in civilian clothing were spotted removing memorials across Russia.
On March 1, the day of Navalny’s funeral, thousands gathered in Moscow to visit his grave, chanting Navalny’s name, “No to war,” “Putin is a killer,” and “Russia will be free.” This was one of the largest anti-government protests since the start of the war, but the police response was surprisingly limited. While the police detained over 104 people across 22 cities, they largely did not intervene in the main demonstration in Moscow.
Still, it is clear to the opposition that the authorities’ grace in this case is an exception, and that political repressions will only increase as long as Putin stays in power. The repressions within Russia, along with the mass exodus of Russians with oppositional views since the start of the war, have shifted attention to the Russian opposition located abroad.
Russian pro-democracy organizations in Western liberal countries can avoid most repressions and organize more openly than those within Russia. Russian America for Democracy in Russia (RADR) is one of the main organizations uniting anti-Putin and anti-war Russians in the US. It has built a grassroots activist network among the Russian diaspora across the country, conducts advocacy campaigns with Congress, raises money for humanitarian and military efforts in Ukraine, and has organized protests at the Russian Embassy in Washington, among other work.
RADR’s work has not gone unnoticed by the Russian government, which declared it an “undesirable organization,” prohibiting it within Russia, after an inquiry by State Duma deputy Andrei Lugovoy. Lugovoy is best known for assassinating former FSB officer and Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko, who received asylum and citizenship in the UK after speaking out about the FSB’s extralegal assassinations, with polonium in London in 2006. Lugovoy has emerged as a leader in the attacks on the Russian opposition, having co-authored a recent law allowing the Russian government to confiscate the property of people charged with spreading “fake news about the Russian military.” While discussing the bill, he said that “whoever tries to hurt the motherland will die outside the country like the last dog.”
Lugovoy’s persecution and threats have not stopped RADR, with hundreds gathering at the Russian Embassy in Washington to remember Navalny on February 16, the day of his death, and over the following weeks as well. Nadia Valueva, who has been taking part in Russian pro-democracy protests since 2008 and helps organize RADR protests at the embassy, told the author that she could recall no other time in recent memory when this many protestors came out to the embassy.
Since then, RADR has continued holding protests at the embassy, to the dismay of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its Ambassador-at-Large, Gennady Askaldovich, stated on February 20 that Russian “relocants” outside the country with an “anti-Russian” position who commit any “provocations” during the upcoming Russian Presidential Election will be brought to justice. He also called Russian pro-democracy activists extremists and russophobes, and said that he is aware of a variety of “provocations” planned for the election, presumably including RADR’s planned protest at the embassy. Activists have ignored this as an empty threat, with Valueva saying that “threats are a good sign, like Navalny says, they mean that we are strong; they do this to scare us because they hear and see us, but Navalny would be disappointed if we stopped coming out.”
RADR has also maintained a continuous memorial for Navalny outside the embassy, which is removed almost daily. In response to an inquiry by Dmitry Valuev, President of RADR, the DC Department of Public Works said it removes stickers from poles near the embassy, but does not touch flowers. Though there is no explicit evidence that embassy staff are responsible, pictures showed an employee of the former Russian Consulate in Hamburg, Germany removing a memorial set up at the consulate building. Previous acts of vandalism against displays of support for Ukraine across the street from the embassy show a history of similar behavior.
Though the Hamburg consulate employee violently pushed Natalia Freudenberg, who documented him destroying the memorial, to the ground when she tried to intervene, the Russian opposition remains undeterred. Pro-democracy activists joke that the Russians who came to America to work as diplomats are now relegated to the less prestigious role of street cleaners.
So, what is the state of the Russian opposition in the wake of Navalny’s death? Reinvigorated, especially abroad. Valueva said that activists’ initial melancholy and feelings of helplessness have turned into fury that has fueled the movement’s increasing activity. For now, Russian anti-Putin activists feel safe as long as they stay abroad, and most do not plan on returning to Russia anytime soon. In a conversation with the author, Oksana, who has been attending pro-democracy protests in the US long before Russia began its war against Ukraine and asked to only be identified by her first name, said “Here, where we can express our opinions, we must fight, fight, fight!”