Boko Haram Inches Closer toward Maiduguri
Last Sunday, Boko Haram made a major acquisition in yet another offensive toward its progression through Borno State in Northeastern Nigeria. This victory, while minor in its own right, contributes to what seems to be a pattern of the group’s success over the last two years. If Boko Haram encroaches further and captures Maiduguri, the largest city in Borno, it would be the group’s most significant acquisition yet. If this happens, Boko Haram would dominate most of the eastern part of Nigeria.
In response to citizens’ growing fears, Borno State governor Kashim Shettima continues to reassure his constituents, stating, “This is our land. No fear, no flight, no retreat. We should not flee. We have a history dating back 1,000 years and I swear by Allah we are going to beat [Boko Haram].”
Yet, the Nigerian army’s relatively poor success rate in combatting Boko Haram calls this confidence into question.
Because one of the major obstacles to the Nigerian military’s success against Boko Haram has been a lack of military resources and training, it seems intuitive that the country should accept the abundance of aid being offered by the African Union, the United Nations, and western powers ranging from the United States to the United Kingdom. Yet Nigeria has promptly refused most forms of such aid, reiterating that western African forces are more than capable of mitigating the burden and chaos initiated by Boko Haram.
Nigeria may be wise in this sense, since military troops from Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria have shown full commitment to abating the militant threat. Nigeria and its neighbors vowed to strengthen regional commitment after a summit hosted by French President François Hollande in May 2014 following public outcry caused by Boko Haram’s kidnapping of over 270 schoolgirls.
The summit involved representatives from states in the region who also could be affected by the spread of Boko Haram. President Paul Biya of Cameroon explicitly expressed his desire to “declare war on Boko Haram.” President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria openly shared a similar sentiment, especially since he hopes to shore up concerns over stability before the upcoming presidential election in Nigeria later this month. President Mahamadou Issoufou of the Niger Republic, President Yayi Boni of Benin, and lastly, President Idriss Déby of Chad--perhaps the largest military contributor to the conflict outside Nigeria--attended as well.
The summit sought to encourage local leaders to develop a strategic plan of action against Boko Haram through bilateral and multilateral steps. On a bilateral basis, the states would better coordinate patrols between the nations involved and pool their intelligence to manage incoming insurgent activity more effectively. On a multilateral basis, the states would establish broader pooled intelligence units, create dedicated teams to identify means of strategy implementation, and formulate counterterrorism strategies.
Nigeria should find these small steps encouraging, as regional cooperation efforts like those taken at the summit are the most effective means to empower local communities and to establish sustainable success in the fight against insurgent activity.
Yet, in many ways, the acceptance of direct military aid from foreign countries could render the region dependent on these nations moving forward, which would undermine the legitimacy of local governments and create a potentially contentious environment between these nations in the future. Rarely do western powers want to intervene in a region without having some sort of personal interest at heart. Upon his visit to Nigeria on January 23, John Kerry noted, “the U.S. could do more to help against Boko Haram, as long as the elections passed off smoothly.”
President Goodluck Jonathan and other Nigerian officials want to avoid a scenario all too familiar to them. Or maybe they just want to avoid further national embarrassment. The problem of Boko Haram cannot be solved merely through military actions: the group has enjoyed a strong base of support since 2002, even before their military engagement began. Addressing the socio-economic factors that have led so many to support Boko Haram would be the best method toward a long-term solution. This includes addressing issues such as rampant corruption in the government, a lack of representation, and growing income inequality that benefits an elite few and marginalizes many more. Additionally, given Nigeria’s terrible human rights record, from the victims’ standpoint there is almost no difference between the Nigerian military and Boko Haram: bringing in foreign aid may even further expose the problem and embarrass the Jonathan administration, which is something they cannot afford on the verge of such pivotal elections. (The United States already cannot sell arms to the Nigerian Military because of its human rights record.)
In terms of the fight against Boko Haram, it seems that both Nigerian and foreign officials have their own agendas at hand, putting off the interests, and more importantly, the safety of the affected populations.