Breakaway Territories: The Price of NATO Aspirations?

On February 18th, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a “border agreement” with Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia.  This move is only the latest in a series of recent Russian treaties and legislation aimed at deepening the state’s integration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, amounting to a de facto annexation of the Georgian territories.  Russian forces have occupied these regions since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and recent treaties have granted Russia control of armed forces, security services and trade policy in exchange for Moscow’s protection and economic guarantees.  The new measures have been widely denounced by Georgia and the international community as illegal and outrageous. Source: Дмитрий-5-Аверин (Own work)

While Russia has consistently described its involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as driven by purely humanitarian concerns, remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov at a February 18th news conference shed light on Russia’s wider strategic motivations for the deal.  Nestled between statements about Russian-Ossetian cooperation, Lavrov added ominously that the Kremlin was prepared to adopt all “necessary measures” should NATO continue its attempts to “drag” Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic alliance.  This sentiment echoes statements made earlier this month by Russia’s NATO representative Alexander Grushko, who argued that NATO’s intention to establish a training center in Georgia is “provocative” and “a step towards escalation of tension and worsening of regional security.”

Georgia, like Ukraine, has aspired to NATO membership for over a decade as part of its intention to distance itself from Russia and integrate more closely with Europe.  However, Moscow has consistently voiced its ardent opposition to such an alliance, as it considers NATO’s encroachment into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence as an unacceptable threat to national security.  Formerly, NATO’s fear of antagonizing Russia caused the alliance to keep aspiring members like Georgia and Ukraine at arms length.  Recent events in Ukraine, however, have served to break this cycle of appeasement to Russia.

In recent months, NATO involvement in the post-Soviet space has increased significantly, as have the frequency and seriousness of talks to get Georgia on track for membership.  In January, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow visited Tbilisi for talks with top Georgian officials.  Vershbow discussed the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, including preparations to establish a Joint Training Center in Georgia.  Addressing the Atlantic Council of Georgia, Vershbow gave the most concrete assurance of membership that Georgia has received in years, stating, “The decision that NATO leaders took at an earlier Summit in Bucharest in 2008 still stands.  Your country will become a member of NATO, provided that it meets all the necessary requirements.”

It is clear that the Kremlin perceives increased NATO involvement in Georgia as a major threat, and one that it will not take lying down.  The fact that Moscow has demonstrated its willingness to provide extensive financial support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite Russia’s own ongoing financial crisis is a clear indication that it perceives NATO’s presence in Georgia to be a critical threat to national security.  Georgia and NATO show no indication of backing down, however, and it seems that Russia’s bluff may soon be put to the test.  Despite Georgia’s outrage at Russia’s integration treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi leadership sees NATO membership as a strategic priority that is worth the strain on its territorial integrity.  Furthermore, it is not clear what other leverage Russia holds over Georgia, having already played the breakaway territories card.  Georgia is dependent on Russia neither for energy nor trade, and so is less vulnerable to traditional instruments of Russian political pressure.  That being said, there is no doubt that the Kremlin meant the integration treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a warning.  But, it begs the question, a warning of what?