Egypt and Iran’s New Cooperation To Influence Regional Balance of Power

Leaked emails indicate that the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif specifically requested that Egypt be included in the most recent informal negotiations on Syria held in Lausanne, Switzerland in mid-October. This development heightens growing concerns in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. that Egypt may be shifting away from its traditional Sunni allies in Syria, towards Russia and Iran.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reached out to Zarif on October 4, just after Russian bombings of Aleppo recommenced and the U.S.-Russia nationwide ceasefire broke down. In an email, Kerry invited Zarif to “a very small meeting of key stakeholders on Syria...to explore the political solution” with “Russia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, KSA [Saudi Arabia], and the U.S..” Zarif responded, “Why not Egypt too?” Days later, both Egypt and Iraq had been invited, ensuring a numerical balance of anti and pro-Assad states at the meeting.

Iran’s move to include Egypt is strategically and historically noteworthy. Iran and Egypt have been diplomatically estranged from one another since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Egypt’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel, one of Iran’s main regional adversaries. Before 2013, under pro-Muslim Brotherhood President Muhammad Morsi’s leadership, Egypt’s goals in Syria aligned closely with those of Saudi Arabia. Egypt defended the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood against Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

In contrast to former President Morsi, current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has taken a series of steps to move away from Saudi Arabia and other anti-Assad states and toward Iran. In September, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry met with Zarif at a United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. Shoukry said they discussed Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s deep differences in Syria.

Days before Iran requested Egypt’s presence at the Lausanne meeting, Egypt shocked regional stakeholders by voting in favour of Russia’s U.N. Security Council resolution, supported by Iran, over another resolution proposed by France and backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the U.S.. Egypt’s vote should not come as a complete surprise, given Egypt’s recent military cooperation with Russia and Iran. In September 2014, Egypt made a $3.5 billion deal with Moscow. More recently, Russia has explored using military bases in Egypt to launch attacks, and the two states have carried out several joint military exercises.

Egypt’s UN resolution vote, a clear display of support for Russia, provoked particularly strong backlash from Saudi Arabia, traditionally an ally of Egypt. The Saudi U.N. envoy described the Egyptian vote as “painful.” In addition, Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state oil company, announced that it would halt exports to Egypt for the rest of the month.

However, Saudi Arabia’s coercive rhetorical and economic efforts to change Sisi’s position have not lasted because a prolonged adversarial relationship with Egypt fundamentally opposes the Gulf State’s interests. Egypt is a major player in the region and a key fellow Sunni partner that Saudi Arabia cannot afford to lose. As a result, only two days after oil exports were halted, Saudi Arabia reopened exports and bailed out Egypt for $2 billion, depositing the funds into the Egyptian central bank.

As Iran’s request for Egypt to attend Kerry’s Lausanne meeting suggests, Saudi Arabia is failing to maintain Egyptian support for the anti-Assad contingent in Syria. Recent developments show that Egypt is increasingly aligned with Iran and Russia. Although Egypt’s regional role may not surpass that of Turkey or Israel, it may be key in shifting the balance of regional influence in Syria away from the Gulf States, and toward the pro-Assad contingent.