Illusions of Sunshine

Since its foundation in 2004 as a part of The Sunshine Policy, South Korea’s former conciliatory foreign policy toward North Korea, Kaesong Industrial Complex has been a symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation, economic cooperation, and prospective peace. But it may now fade into history. On February 10th, the South Korean government, as a reaction to North Korea’s unilateral satellite rocket test, announced the decision to shut down Kaesong Industrial Complex, causing a total  of 280 South Korean personnel to move out of the industrial complex the next day. There previously have been short partial shut downs of the complex due to the unstable nature of inter-Korean relation, but this is the first time the South Korean government decided to completely evacuate its citizens from the industrial complex.

Contrary to the original intention of The Sunshine Policy, Hong Yong-Pyo, a director of Ministry of Unification claimed that “about 70 percent” of the money from Kaesong Industrial Complex has been funneled into North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party. Then the Workers’ Party has mainly used the money to fund its nuclear development projects and to purchase luxury goods for the elites. It was the symbolic significance of Kaesong Industrial Complex in inter-Korean relations that resulted in its continued operation even though the South Korean government had acknowledged the funneling of cash. Hong, however, refused to disclose any valid evidence for his claim because of the confidentiality of information.

This statement is controversial for two reasons. First, it confirms the long-held criticism of The Sunshine Policy that any form of financial aid to North Korea would only hasten its obtainment of nuclear weapons. According to a recent poll taken by Korean Gallup on February 19th, 55 percent of South Korean citizens favor the halt of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and any form of aid to North Korea. The advocates of The Sunshine Policy will lose leverage in their effort to re-adopt such conciliatory approaches toward North Korea. Future inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation may only sound outdated and naïve.

Second, it may seriously damage competency and reliability of the South Korean government’s foreign policy. A former director of the Unification Ministry said that the South Korean government has failed to be a reliable “manager” of North Korea’s nuclear program and that it has rather become a responsible “provider” of the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula. Some argue that Hong is irresponsible for saying such a controversial claim without disclosing any further evidence and that it is imprudent to draw any conclusions on his claim yet. If Hong’s claim is true, it seems difficult for the South Korean government to be free from blame not only within the country but also from the international society.

President Park Geun-Hye of South Korea, in a speech at the National Assembly on February 16th, said that “we should no longer be deceived or threatened by North Korea, nor offer them unconditional support.” Multilateral actions taken by the international society, President Park added, are crucial to deterrence of North Korea’s further expansion of its nuclear program.

Whether the South Korean government can gain consensus from the international community for multilateral sanctions on North Korea remains largely uncertain.