Iraqi Government Threatens Turkish Forces
Recent protests by the Iraqi government against the presence of Turkish forces within their borders threaten the operation to liberate Mosul from the self-styled Islamic State (IS). ThePopular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a combination of militias formed by the Iraqi government targeting IS, declared that they may resort to attacking the Turkish forces. Iraq claims that Turkey is violating their sovereignty by training troops in Bashiqa, a town north of Mosul, without government approval.Mosul, a large city with 1.5 million inhabitants, remains one of the few major areas under IS control, preventing coalition forces from claiming victory. Within a month, a coalition of Iraqi troops, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and international forces (such as U.S. and French artillery) will surround the city and attempt to drive the weakening group out. Turkey now demands that its troops also play a role in the Mosul offensive as part of their goal for ending “sectarian conflict.” However, as regional precedents and alignments intermix with the political situation, uncertainty jeopardizes this landmark campaign.
The political affiliations in this dispute, when analyzed, seem to break down into religious affiliations as both sides of the disagreement exploit identities to further their consolidation of power. The Iraqi government consists mostly of Shi’a adherents, including the PMF, which also receives direct support from the Iranian government, a Shi’a theocratic regime. Turkey, however, is mostly Sunni, and President Erdogan has especially capitalized on traditional Sunni Islamist beliefs. Iraq views the Turkish troops focus on training specifically Sunni and Kurdish fighters (also mostly Sunni) as a form of delegitimizing their government.
Iraq has persisted in using various different channels to remove the Turkish troops from their territory. Besides constant hostile statements against Turkey, the government has threatened the Turkish ambassador in person, called for UN Security Council emergency meetings, and engaged in public spats with President Erdogan. In their view, Turkey, by ignoring the official Iraqi declarations, violates Iraqi sovereignty by the constant flouting of government decisions.
The public comments on both sides of the argument have escalated into blatant religious sectionalism, a demonstration of the constant reliance of factions on politicized religious differences in the Middle East. Turkey’s Prime Minister Yildirim expressed concern that a Shi’a-skewed liberation force would change “the demographic structure” of Mosul and increase sectarian violence. Turkey explicitly supports a Sunni buffer in Iraq to counteract Iranian Shi’a ties in the region. This statement partially contradicts their commitment to prevent sectarianism, as it directly plays to the religious and political divisions that have polarized Iraq and other Arab states.
Once its territory is consolidated, Iraq worries about what will happen to national unity. Turkey directly supports and trains not only the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, the semiautonomous region of the republic, but the Sunni former governor Nujaifi and his militia. After working together with the Kurds, Nujaifi now believes that his region of Nineveh should have more autonomy. Iraq views Turkey’s actions as an infiltration into their political system to gain allies and increase influence in the region with proxy leaders (such as Nujaifi).
The battle in Mosul could potentially be the culmination of the IS demise, as IS operations have regained 70 percent of the territory they had controlled in Iraq at their peak two years ago. The inability to cooperate as a united front endangers the security of the plans, as the exchange of insults has diminished the focus on destroying IS. If the attack fails, IS will maintain control over a major urban center, facilitating its ability to induce violence and function as an independent government.