Japan’s Constitutional Conundrum

The Japanese Constitution was signed in 1947, while the Japanese state was still under postwar US occupation. While the Constitution has conferred many admirable qualities of a Western liberal democracy onto the Japanese polity, it has also been a long-standing symbol of Japan’s submission to Western norms and US interests. In particular, Article 9, more commonly known as the Peace Clause, was an expedient move by the US to prevent remilitarization of Japan in the Cold War era and ameliorate the fears of the US’s other regional partners. Reinterpreting the Constitution has heavy symbolic significance – presaging Japan’s return as a “normal” state and recrafting the state’s independent identity. Even more importantly, the Liberal Democratic Party is pursuing reinterpretation because in an increasingly hostile region, Japan needs to regain its ability to craft its own independent foreign policy. The Peace Clause renounces Japan’s right to war except in self-defense, preventing Japan from even exercising collective self-defense. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pushing for the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to reinterpret this Clause – a less democratic process than a constitutional amendment – so Japan can actually defend its allies. As the situation currently stands, if a missile was launched from a hostile country, such as China or North Korea, towards a Japanese friend, such as the US or South Korea, Japan is constitutionally prohibited from defending the US or South Korea, even if it had the military capabilities to do so. This ban hindered Japan’s contribution to the Iraq reconstruction efforts as well (2004-06); Japanese Self Defense Forces were effectively dependent on Dutch soldiers for their protection and constitutionally prohibited from shooting back at Iraqi insurgents even when their Dutch protectors were attacked unless they were being directly targeted. With an increasingly powerful and aggressive China at its doorstep, Japan’s current situation is untenable. Japan needs to be able to increase military cooperation with other states – both with the US, Japan’s military patron, and smaller regional states, which Japan is trying to band together into an anti-China coalition.

Despite the foreign origin and unrealistic naiv

eté of Article 9, many Japanese citizens oppose Abe’s proposed reinterpretation. On June 17, opponents held major rallies in Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Nagano, Kanazawa, Osaka, Takamatsu and other cities. An estimated 5,000 people gathered in Tokyo’s Chiyoda Ward. According to a Kyodo poll conducted June 21-22, 55.4% of the Japanese public opposes Abe’s bid to overturn the ban on collective self-defense. An even higher percentage opposes Abe’s choice of methods: 57.7% express disapproval of his choice to use a Cabinet reinterpretation than a formal amendment. Constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds vote in the Upper and Lower House, as well as passage through a national referendum. Because of Abe’s procedural choice, pressure has been concentrated on the New Komeito party, the Liberal Democratic Party’s junior coalition partner, to stand strong against Abe. New Komeito’s power is tied to the Nichiren Buddhist group Soka Gakkai, which is staunchly antiwar. 40 people gathered in front of New Komeito headquarters in Shinjuku Ward as part of the protests. Japanese citizens who oppose reinterpretation are proud of Japan’s pacificst identity and fear that this will invite regional conflict and lead Japan back down a path of militarization.

These fears are not entirely unfounded either. Constitutional reinterpretation will give China even more fodder to charge that Abe is a hawk deliberately destabilizing the region for his own grand ambitions. Japan’s attempt to build up its capabilities to deter Chinese aggression could ally other regional states against Japan, inviting the very catastrophe that Japan is trying to avoid. However, China’s aggressive behavior is pushing away many potential Chinese allies, with perhaps the exception of South Korea. Recent conflicts in the South China Sea with disputes over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands has aligned the Philippines and Vietnam into a closer military relationship with Japan. Japan-South Korea cooperation is not entirely a lost cause either, so long as Japan can manage to exercise restraint and consideration (for example, Japanese politicians should stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and threatening to “reconsider” the Kono Statement).

Japan reinterpreting the Constitution is also imperative for the US-Japan security relationship. Under the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan has been able to focus on its economic growth while relying on the US’s defense umbrella throughout the Cold War era, and this formula worked while the US was enjoying its own postwar economic boom. But in the current fiscal environment, the US Congress is becoming increasingly recalcitrant to spend on defense. If Japan wants to keep the US engaged, it has to show it is committed to its own defense just as much as the US is. The ratcheting tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea plays a role in this – though the US has publicly pledged that these islands are covered by the US-Japan Security Alliance, the US would rather not get dragged into a conflict with China over these specks of rock, and Japan knows it too. Japan’s increasing flexibility in its use of military force would be a positive development for the US and for the US-Japan relationship. Yet increasing flexibility of military responses while parrying Chinese accusations of imperial ambitions is a dangerous game – and one that Japan still has to master.