Peak of Terrorist Activity on the Horizon as IS and al-Qaeda Compete

Nearly three weeks ago, 30 people from at least 18 countries were killed and hundreds of others taken hostage by al-Qaeda gunmen in a luxury hotel in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso. After detonating a bomb outside the hotel, the assailants stormed inside, where they remained entrenched until government forces regained control the next morning.  

While the siege of the hotel in Ouagadougou was the first major attack in Burkina Faso by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), it merely continues a year-long trend of more intense and splintered terrorist activity in a changing West African landscape, as certain terrorist groups, notably al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS), compete for influence.

Previously allied, IS and al-Qaeda split in 2014, each pursuing separate strategies to bolster recruitment. The fracture occurred when al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi disowned ISIS, citing its refusal to follow al-Qaeda orders and labeling its tactics too brutal and radical. Since then, ISIS has renamed itself the Islamic State (IS), which marked the beginning of its self-proclaimed global Islamic caliphate. IS proceeded to make sweeping territorial gains through Iraq and Syria and quickly conducted and inspired attacks abroad in Indonesia, France, Lebanon and the United States.

 Whereas leaders of al-Qaeda structured a very hierarchical system of operations and carefully coordinated attacks on symbolic targets, IS has been less ideological in nature and more tolerant of independent initiatives and indiscriminate violence. The two groups diverge primarily over how operations should be conducted rather than over differences in ideology. As IS drove further into Syria, they began engaging in combat.

 Some analysts predicted jihadi-on-jihadi violence would ultimately be beneficial for counter-terrorist objectives, "as infighting burns up resources, turns off donors and sours foreign fighter recruitment flows." The failure to unify jihadists would inhibit coordinated attacks against the West as well as  the regional growth and clout of terrorist networks.

 Unfortunately, given the spate of terrorist activity abroad, and with West Africa serving as a primary theatre of conflict, an alternative dynamic has ensued: al-Qaeda and IS networks are competing and growing at the same time.

In the face of competition, both al-Qaeda and IS have stronger incentives than ever before to conduct large-scale terrorist attacks; foreign fighters and resources are at stake, and successful strikes are needed to attract them.

 At the present moment, IS organized activity is strongest in North Africa, including Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, as well as Nigeria, given its 2014 alliance with Boko Haram. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is strongest in the northwest of the continent, with active operations in Algeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Both groups grapple for influence in Libya and Niger.

 Shortly after IS's attacks in Paris and Beirut, AQIM conducted a seizure of the Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali, which resulted in 21 deaths. In December, reports surfaced of Boko Haram, an IS affiliate, conducting suicide bombings in Cameroon. The Ouagadougou attack, with links to AQIM, was conducted nearly a month later.

Members of both IS and al-Qaeda have taken to social media after their attacks to boast about their brutality and elevated prominence. Since its conception, IS has clearly been winning the social media battle, with more “successes” in the form of gruesome displays of violence, including beheadings of American journalists Steven Sotloff and James Foley in 2014.

 As IS gains ground in terms of recruits, arms, and territory, al-Qaeda may be forced to engage in even more brutal and frequent displays of violence, with West Africa bearing the brunt of the bloodshed.