Syriza win for Russia?
In elections last month, anti-austerity party Syriza was swept into power on the hopes that a new government would alleviate Greece’s debt troubles and stimulate growth. In the weeks since, the European Union (EU) and Athens have been negotiating over the future of the Greek bailout program. However, the new Syriza government has jolted the EU’s foreign policy agenda. Due to economic harm, Athens is not keen to impose further sanctions on Russia. Nor is it excited about the prospect of Ukraine’s place in Europe. Before entering into power, Syriza’s ministers downvoted the 2014 Association Agreement with Ukraine and several resolutions against Russia. This has had many observers wondering whether Syriza’s victory is also a victory for Russia’s relations with the EU.
European foreign policy is carried out on the principle of unanimity among its twenty-eight member states. This is partly why it was so difficult for Europe to galvanize against Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. Bringing twenty-eight different voices with a plethora of different interests into a coherent position is no easy act. Following tougher EU sanctions, several Central European states expressed dismay at the EU’s strategy. They lamented that sanctions would only serve to harm Europe. Unlike other detractors, Greece is under the spotlight due to its debate over the bailout. Almost any expression that has further implications for European policy from Greece will carry weight. An anti-Brussels stance by Greece on Russia could give other member states encouragement to speak out as well.
Greece it is not expected to torpedo any European initiative on Russia and Greece agreed to extend existing sanctions until September. Athens was nonetheless unwilling to endorse a statement threatening stronger measures should fighting resume in Ukraine. If Moscow is listening, this is perhaps the lesser of all evils. The Kremlin will benefit from Syriza’s Russian sympathy, but it cannot expect Athens to undo all the damage that the Atlantic sanctions have wrought. Greece’s leverage in Europe is in the potential of its own collapse – and that is not an enviable position. A Greek default and exit from the Eurozone would send shockwaves across Europe that would diminish its anemic economic state. Yet Greece would be hurt worse than any other country. While Europe has a serious stake in keeping Greece afloat, it is Greece that should seek out help. This logic makes it clear that Greece’s Russia policy is on the negotiating table. The EU may even condition a rescue accord on Athens’ support against Russia.
It is difficult to claim that Russia has won a stable, strong ally in Europe at a time when EU-Russia relations are deteriorating. The friends it does have are not Russian-puppets. They follow their own countries’ interests and they do not have the weight to change the bloc’s course. Greece, while now on a loudspeaker, is not an inherent friend for Russia. Syriza’s sympathy for Russia is not endless, and it might get cut short if the conditions are right. However, if Greece fails to settle with the EU over its debt, it may turn to other sources for relief. If Russia were to bail-out Greece, it may harken to a strengthening partnership. It would however come at a significant cost to the beleaguered Russian economy. Still, signals from Russia demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is about security. At that point, Moscow may be willing to go to great lengths and endure serious pains to secure it.