The Curious Case of Afghan Poppies

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John Sopko admitted that despite over $7.6 billion spent by the United States on counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, poppy cultivation reached an all time high in 2013. An all time high of over 209,000 hectacres (about 806 miles) of newly arable land has been used to grow poppies, resulting in a 36% increase in  Afghanistan's poppy cultivation by the end of 2013. This news undermines US counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan. Poppy yields are directly sold to insurgents, who use the poppy products like opium to finance their missions.  Although the United Nations first reported these figures in a 2013 Summary Report, the report from the Special Inspector General marked official recognition of the growing problem.

Why Poppies?

Poppies, specifically poppy products including opium, morphine, and heroin, have had a long and complicated history in foreign affairs. Opium was a staple of Sino-British trade in the early 17th century, over which both nations fought the Opium Wars. US merchants, including John Jacob Astor, were also involved in the smuggling of opium. The majority of production in "the Golden Triangle" of Southeast Asia addictions maintained markets, both legal and illegal. By the 20th Century opium, heroin, and morphine were all regulated or banned in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Source: Tony Hisgett

Trade for poppy products, however, did not subside. The Afghan market first produced opium in 1932. During the Vietnam War, US military and intelligence made alliances with local opium lords in order to gain allies against the communist threat. After losing the war, US markets turned to other sources.  Since 1978, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, have been the primary centers of opium trade. Today, Afghanistan produces more than 80% of the world's opium.

Previous Measures in Afghanistan

Previous efforts to stem the poppy's popularity in Afghanistan have been futile. US aid programs awarded grants to farmers who switched to wheat, but wheat yields are consistently lower than poppy yields, which made the switch less profitable. In 2001, when the Taliban was in power, poppy cultivation reached an all time low with 99% eradication, as the practice was banned because drugs were seen as violating Islam. With US deposition of the Taliban, poppy growth blossomed largely due to the power vacuum. Growth of poppies, the UN noted in their report, remained largest in unstable regions like Helmand and Kandahar.

Similarly, international attempts to quash the poppy trade have been marked by discord. In 2008, the New York Times wrote that intra-NATO squabbling rendered counter-narcotics operations ineffective due to limited ground enforcement of commands. Some NATO allies told their soldiers that national policies prohibited them from engaging in counter-narcotics efforts abroad. Similarly, NATO has been careful to avoid undermining the income of Afghan farmers. In 2010, Russia asked for the Afghan poppies to be sprayed in order to combat rising addiction at home, only to have its proposal rejected by NATO.

Market for Afghan Poppies

Poppies sell for around $130 per kilo and cultivation is a highly profitable industry for both farmers of poppies and organized insurgents. Poppy production makes up 4% of Afghanistan's GDP. With growth largest in the Southern and Western provinces, Afghanistan's poppy cultivation has been valued at around $3 billion. Addiction to poppy products is a growing problem, and in 2010 the United Nations reported that 60% of all heroin demand came from Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, with the exclusion of China. Afghanistan's addicts comprise nearly 5.3% of its total population, an estimated 1.6 million people. Few international donors have committed to treatment of addiction in Afghanistan.

US stake in the poppy industry

In Afghanistan, poppy growth is observed to correlate with instability. With respect to counterterrorism measures, fighting poppy production in Afghanistan has been key to stemming nearly $155 million in funds to insurgents, including the Taliban. Despite the signature of the most recent deal to extend US-troop presence, poppy production could increase if farmers are left without support or protection.

The failure of US funds to counter drug trafficking come as the NATO turns over control of the country to Afghan forces. To spray the fields would undermine the livelihoods of Afghan farmers, but without eradication of poppy production, funds will continue to support insurgent groups. While the promotion of alternative crops could be a viable alternative, the lack of infrastructure, stability, and the failure of US programs to address the issue with Afghanistan-focused solutions are key hindrances.  Lack of government support from Afghanistan, according to the SIGAR report, is largely to blame for failure of US programs, although Afghanistan's new leadership under President Ashraf Ghani could change this.

Regardless, US acknowledgement of failure is a key first step, and the future of its counterterrorism programs depend on whether or not its second steps are adequate.