US Withdrawal from Asia

Certain U.S. presidential candidates, such as Donald Trump, have recently proposed the full withdrawals of American military units from South Korea and Japan unless those allies begin to pay a larger share of the costs required to keep them there. Numerous journalists, policymakers, and analysts such as the Straits Times have since remarked that these Pacific American allies already shoulder up to 75 percent of these costs. However, regardless of the specific financial dividends, many other risks would likely arise should the United States withdraw its forces. First and foremost, Japan and South Korea would be placed under enormous pressure to commit immense amounts of funding to military spending to make up for the loss of collective security granted by the United States. This insecurity and fear of conflict due to the loss of the American shield may encourage more aggressive behavior in regional disputes and cause normally small flare-ups to escalate more quickly into military engagements. Furthermore, either state, facing nuclear armed rivals of North Korea and China, would likely pursue a nuclear weapons program of their own, an idea some candidates have backed as reasonable. This, however, would only increase the likelihood of open conflict in Asia, an end which would benefit nobody.

Apart from scuppering longstanding security arrangements, withdrawal from Asia would also run the risk of scrapping the newly negotiated TPP and other tools for containing Chinese expansion. Collectively, these fractures would serve to strengthen Chinese institutions such as the AIIB and continually reduce the perceived utility of states acting in line with American interests. Such a withdrawal might effectively serve to yield half of the Pacific to another great power without a shot even being fired.

Additionally, withdrawing military units from an overseas deployment where there are no active combat operations would not save money. A marine division garrisoned near Seoul costs just as much to maintain as one in western Texas. The only financial difference is that South Korea is willing to pay 40 percent of the tab to put it in their territory. In this way, it could actually cost the United States more to withdraw units from these currently peaceful deployments.

Lastly, European and other allies around the world would react accordingly to an American unilateral cessation of a longstanding treaty. These allied states around the world would actively question whether the United States truly maintains its commitments to NATO or other arrangements, or whether it would simply cast them aside at its earliest convenience. Much as Japan and South Korea would be forced to become increasingly aggressive in pursuit of national interest, other allie

d states would feel compelled to do the same, unsure if they could depend on American support in the future.

Ultimately, though, it might appear that withdrawing American forces from allied states in the Pacific might be a necessary evil in order to save money and stave off financial problems at home, the United States receives numerous benefits across the geopolitical spectrum from its deployments there. Not only are historically expansionist states content to operate within an orderly security framework, but they are also willing to accept some of the burden, permitting the United States to have a greater global military presence at a lower cost.