With the Ever-Growing Threat of Boko Haram, an Objective View on Nigeria's Defensive Competency

While the world watches the development of the ISIS threat in the Middle East, the other Islamic State continues to plague West Africa. Since 2009, Boko Haram has aimed to create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria complete with Sharia criminal courts. The Islamist militant group is responsible for a laundry list of indiscriminate attacks, the targets of which include civilians, police, churches, and schools. The group kidnapped more than 200 schoolgirls in April 2014, and more recently, over 500 women and children from the Nigerian town of Damasak. Both groups, along with numerous other kidnapping victims, remain missing. Boko Haram spreads terror not only in Nigeria, but also across parts of Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. The related violence has killed over 10,000 and displaced about 1.5 million in the past five years. Boko Haram was created in 2002 in the northeastern Nigerian town of Mauduguri by Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf. At its inception, the group focused on teaching rather than violence; in fact, Boko Haram’s members prefer to refer to the organization as “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” In the rest of the world, however, it is better known as “Western education is forbidden.” In 2009, the group launched its military campaign for Islamic rule, exacerbating tensions between the predominantly Christian south, and the predominantly Muslim  north. Nigeria’s population of 170 million is roughly equally divided between the two groups. It is possible that increasing regional economic disparity, in addition to government corruption and abusive security focus, fostered an environment conducive to Boko Haram’s military campaign.

Since Muhammas Yusuf’s death in July 2009, a hard-line militant named Abubakar Shekau has led Boko Haram’s escalating attacks. From July 2010 to April 2013, Boko Haram action accelerated using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to carry out kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations. In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency: more troops were sent in with wider powers to arrest and seize “any building or structure”. Despite these measures, killings increased in the following year and emboldened Boko Haram, which began to seize larger towns and cities, some with populations upwards of 250,000. By the end of 2014 the group had conquered a territory the size of Belgium in northeastern Nigeria. Recently, the group declared its allegiance to ISIS through an audio message posted online by supporters.

How is it that Boko Haram has been able to evolve from an outcast in the global Jihadi community to the biggest ISIS affiliate? Why was it able to move from hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to holding territory? Nigeria’s army, once a powerhouse of African peacekeeping, has been in decline since the country transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democracy in 1999. Nigerians are wary of the military as a result of alternations between elected civilian governments and military dictatorships, human rights abuses, and corruption. Therefore, citizens have voiced their preference for undermining the military by limiting funding.

Governments concerned by another coup provide an additional explanation as to why the group is sparsely supported. Although Nigeria’s annual military budget is $5-6 billion dollars, the funds do not always reach the front lines due to corruption. Nigerian soldiers have reported needing to buy their own uniforms and being sent into combat with an insufficient amount of bullets for their AK47 machine guns, which pale in comparison with Boko Haram’s anti-aircraft guns. U.S. officials estimate that Boko Haram fighters number between 4,000 and 6,000, in comparison to Nigeria’s 90,000 strong standing army. However, Nigeria’s standing army includes a significant number of non-combatant personnel and has about 3,000 troops serving in UN peacekeeping missions. Spread out over a large country the size of Nigeria, the army cannot adequately protect its population of 174 million. Additionally, the Nigerian army suffers from poor leadership, insufficient training in counter-insurgency, and bad morale.

It was not until the postponement of a general election that the Nigerian military made strides against Boko Haram. The vote between President Goodluck Jonathan and former military dictator Muhammadu Buhari was was postponed for six weeks because the army could not guarantee security at polling stations. To bolster support, the African Union authorized a joint force of 7,500 soldiers from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger for initial incursions into Nigeria. The collaboration of neighboring countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, has been particularly valuable. Additionally, France sent soldiers to Niger’s border with Nigeria to coordinate forces in February 2015; assistance from these nations and new arms from Russia and South Africa brought Nigeria a series of successes in March. The army has recaptured 11 of 14 districts held by Boko Haram, which includes the town of Bama, one of the two most important towns held by the militants. Despite strategic successes, the election in late march was disrupted to a limited degree by Boko Haram, which views democracy as a corrupt Western idea. In addition to the threat of Boko Haram, the election was also disrupted by technical difficulties. Machines designed to counteract voting fraud did not accept new biometric voting cards, including that of Goodluck Jonathan.

It remains to be seen whether Nigeria can hold onto its recent military success. In late March, President Goodluck Jonathan claimed that Boko Haram would be routed in one month. However, Boko Haram could revert back to hit-and-run guerrilla tactics even if the Nigerian military reclaims its territory; moreover, complete reclamation continues to present a challenge. While President Jonathan showed confidence, Chad’s president, Mr. Idriss Déby, expressed concern that the Nigerian army would not come occupy the captured territory, and free his forces for advance. Mr. Déby explained that taking action before the rainy season, when maneuvering troops becomes difficult, is key in the fight against Boko Haram. Ultimately, Chad ended up entering the war mainly to protect its economy, which relies on land trade routes through the disputed territory.

It is undeniable that Nigeria’s successes continue largely due to Chadian and Nigerien support. Niger and Chad joined Cameroon, Benin, and Nigeria in the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which focuses on securing the Nigerian side of Lake Chad. The operation is beneficial insofar as Boko Haram cannot utilize the jungled border as a refuge, but the area only represents 10 to 15% of the territory at risk. Nigeria, as it stands, prefers to take on the lion’s share of the fight rather than host an international force on its territory because it remains highly protective of its territorial sovereignty. The MNJTF and Nigeria must build mutual confidence to coordinate an effective force against such an elusive threat. Defensive competency aside, Nigeria must also address the strife between the Christian south and the Muslim north to build peace and security in the long term.