President Donald Trump, left, meets with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, right, at a 2017 ASEAN gala in Manila. (Wikimedia Commons)

Complicating America’s defense strategy in Asia, Phillipine President Rodrigo Duterte officially ended the country’s Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States. After the United States denied a visa to Duterte’s former police chief over human rights violations, Duterte recently barred all of his cabinet members from travelling to the United States and reiterated threats to dramatically reduce security cooperation between the two countries.

He finally made good on the promise: the end of the VFA distances the Philippines from the United States in favor of deeper relations with China. In addition to complicating U.S. military plans, Duterte’s demanded removal of U.S. troops will limit joint counterinsurgency operations against Islamic extremist groups in the country. Washington’s response, however, has been tepid: Defense Secretary Mark Esper described Duterte’s decision as “unfortunate,” while President Donald Trump said that he “[does not] really mind” the new development.

From Occupying the Philippines to…

Occupying the Philippines

The United States and the Philippines, its former colony, share a long and complicated military relationship. The United States took the Philippines as a colony from Spain in 1902 after the Spanish-American War and subsequently occupied it. Although the United States granted the Philippines independence in 1946, it demanded (and received) a 99-year lease on many military bases in the Philippines, on which U.S. forces had “virtual territorial rights.” Following a number of agreements in the 1960s, however, the United States drew down its military presence and withdrew all remaining troops in 1992. The U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement of 1999 returned American troops to the Philippine islands. In recent years, the United States military has aided Filippino government forces in counterinsurgency operations against prominent Islamist extremist groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and the Abu Sayyad Group.

Two Sides of the Same COIN

Terminating the VFA poses serious consequences for both sides. The United States loses an important military foothold in Southeast Asia. Though the United States holds military bases in South Korea, Guam, and Japan, the VFA allowed the United States a limited, yet assured, military interaction with one of its most important regional allies.

The VFA aided the Philippines in two dimensions: a U.S. security presence to counterbalance increasing Chinese regional expansion and joint counterinsurgency operations against Islamist extremist groups. The VFA served as “a deterrent to aggressive actions [by China] in the disputed South China Sea,” where China has been building naval bases and artificial islands. As such, not all of Duterte’s government is on board. Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. argued that “the continuance of the agreement is deemed to be more beneficial to the Philippines compared to any predicates were it to be terminated.”

American soldiers tour a Filipino military camp. (Department of Defense)

Counterinsurgency (COIN) measures also defined this VFA. According to Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at the Council o Foreign Relations and security studies professor at Georgetown University, the joint U.S.-Philippines counterinsurgency efforts against Filipino Islamic extremists was a rare success in a history of COIN failures. Citing his 2006 visit to the Philippines as a guest of U.S. Army Special Forces, Hoffman noted that the “U.S. nation-building in the Philippines has been one of the true success stories in shoring up local capacity to effectively counter terrorism and insurgency.”

Since the termination of the VFA will sever U.S.-Philippines COIN cooperation in all forms, including intelligence-sharing and security training worth more than $550 million from 2016 to 2019, there are concerns that the Philippine security forces may not be sufficiently equipped to address insurgents alone. Hoffman added, “with regards to new threats arising from Islamist groups because of the VFA termination, [those groups are] a very real threat.”

Direct Foreign Investment

Duterte’s spokesperson responded to questions about reentering the VFA by assuring that “[Duterte] will not entertain any initiative coming from the U.S. government to salvage the VFA.” Some analysts argue that given Duterte’s well-documented mercurial approach toward U.S.-Philippines relations, things may yet turn around for Washington and the VFA.

Things may not, however, turn around soon enough. The U.S. withdrawal gives China more freedom to pursue its interests in the region. Ties between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Duterte have strengthened since 2016, and Duterte has long expressed interest toward reorienting diplomatic focus from the United States to Russia and China. Though he also said in a 2016 visit to Beijing that he wanted his country “free of the presence of foreign military troops,” a closer relationship with China may change this dynamic.

With China pledging $9 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for Filipino infrastructure, Duterte may be looking toward Beijing to quickly fill the country’s infrastructure gaps. Even if this means terminating the 20-year VFA with the United States, Duterte is showing little hesitation.