Lake Pangong in Ladakh is one of the world's highest saltwater lakes and one of the world's highest conflict zones. India claims 40 percent of the lake; China 60%. (Wikimedia Commons)

China and India decided on September 10 to “quickly disengage” from their standoff in the Himalayas. The Chinese and Indian foreign ministers jointly promised to implement (yet-unspecified) measures along their disputed border to “maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity.” The past few months have been violent ones for the two states’ border troops: for the first time since 1967, soldiers have died, likely from both sides. It’s certainly good news that the two states have committed to chilling out, for now.

However, if history is any guide, this border dispute is far from over. Each side will accuse the other of starting it. But the common tit-for-tat takeaway is not appropriate here. China’s actions at the border, viewed in the context of broader Chinese foreign policy initiatives, have political experts singing a different tune.

For the past 50 years, 2020 included, the two states have always eventually agreed to a truce. And for the past 50 years, the two states have never agreed on a permanent settlement to end the issue once and for all. Why not?

There’s just one other problem that could prevent a lasting peace: the United States, China’s new rival and India’s new friend. A formerly bilateral conflict now has a third player who threatens to change the game itself.

LINE OF FACTUAL CONTROL

China and India have fought over the Himalayan border since at least 1914, when British, Chinese, and Tibetan representatives could not jointly agree on who controlled what. The final treaty, concluded between Britain (which included India) and Tibet, demarcated the “McMahon Line,” which would serve as the border between British India and China. However, China never agreed to that.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) divides India- and China-controlled Kashmir. China invaded Kashmir in 1962 and took what is now marked Aksai Chin on the map. (Wikimedia Commons)

Even after India became independent and China’s civil war ended, the two powers could not resolve their border dispute. In 1962, after several failed negotiations, Chinese forces decisively defeated the Indian border troops and advanced far past the McMahon Line—to what is now known as the “Line of Actual Control” (LAC). India fought back and reclaimed some territory in 1967 (meaning that there are now two LACs, one recognized by each country), but, since then, tensions had not escalated enough to kill anyone—until this year.

20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash with a Chinese patrol in June. It is likely that some Chinese soldiers were also killed, but the Chinese army has not confirmed or denied this. More recently, each country has accused the other of firing warning shots. In a photograph that was widely circulated through Indian news media, Chinese forces stand along the Sino-Indian border, equipped with guns, spears, and machetes. However, without concrete evidence or investigative journalism, such accusations only invite those watching from afar to question the conflict’s true nature.

PROGRESSION OF AGGRESSION

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invested significant resources and political capital in mending relations with China. When he first took office, Modi rearranged his schedule to make Xi Jinping the first world leader he hosted; more recently, Modi organized the Wuhuan Summit in Chennai, which was a public spectacle convening leaders from both states. Despite these overtures, however, China has failed to reciprocate.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (right). Modi has courted Xi; Xi has not returned the favor. (Wikimedia Commons)

Meanwhile, according to political analysts, China has used the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic as cover for a more aggressive, expansionist foreign policy agenda: creating two new administrative structures in the South China Sea, pushing a harsh national security law in Hong Kong, sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat in the South China Sea, and holding COVID relief packages as economic hostages over African countries like Zambia.

When an non-reciprocating China is busy expanding and consolidating its influence, it comes as no surprise that India would emphatically accuse it of provoking the recent conflicts at the border. China has countered, claiming that Indian troops fired the provocative shots themselves. Both sides maintain that their respective forces have dutifully respected the current “Line of Actual Control.”

Either side could have started the fight, it’s possible that one side sees it as a bigger deal than a simple border dispute.

GAME CHANGING PLAYER

Washington doesn’t need troops at the Siachen glacier to be in on this fight. President Trump claims a vested interest in stopping alleged Chinese expansion across South and Southeast Asia, India included. So, he and Prime Minister Modi recently inaugurated a “great friendship” to bring their countries closer together.

US President Trump (left) meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (right). The two have started what they call a "great friendship" between their countries. (Wikimedia Commons)

For months, high-level planners in the U.S. and India have been in direct contact. The two states have engaged in joint military exercises, and U.S. officials have made public statements expressing their support for India. Reports indicate that Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper have called each other, and both are committed to creating a “strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” The United States now provides attack helicopters, aircraft, and other advanced military systems to India. Prime Minister Modi and President Trump have also discussed this issue.

This American display of support is limited—but markedly more public, in comparison to the United States’ non-response to border tensions in 2017. Why pay attention now? Probably because the US-China relationship has deteriorated substantially since the beginning of the pandemic.

Today, the two states disagree on nearly everything they mutually consider important: the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, global trade, COVID-19, politics, technology, and now India’s borders. Still, the U.S. has no “red line” at which it will retaliate against allegedly unacceptable Chinese expansion. With China pushing the US in so many places, pushing a little harder in one of those places won’t make so much of a difference.

When India can’t win without high costs, and where the US won’t directly intervene, China can only gain from reasserting its borders in the Himalayas. India isn’t what they’re really after, anyway. Considering the many other instances of activist Chinese foreign policy around the world, the Chinese government actually seems to be prodding at the authority of the United States. India’s borders are just the next battleground.

While diplomats are encouraging China to resolve its differences with India directly, it might be more worthwhile for the Chinese to sit down with the United States instead.