North Korea Inviting Japanese Officials for Abduction Briefing

Though Japan’s relations with South Korea and China were strained over the summer by the reinterpretation of Article 9 and Abe’s supplication of an offering to Yasukuni Shrine, détente was achieved in an unexpected place: on the Korean peninsula, north of the 38th parallel. After a sixteen month hiatus, Japan and the Democratic Republic of Korea met for the first time this year in March, and followed up with another meeting in May. At the May meeting, the DPRK agreed to reopen investigations into Japanese nationals abducted in the 1970s and 1980s in return for Japan easing certain unilateral economic sanctions. Depending on the results of the investigation, Japan has stated that it may consider providing humanitarian assistance.

Though Japanese policymakers expected the first report on North Korea’s investigation (promised for “late summer or early fall”) to be released sometime in mid to late September, they have been kept waiting until now. Just last Monday, North Korea invited Japanese officials to Pyongyang to be briefed on the preliminary results.

Ever since Kim Jong Il admitted to North Korean agents abducted 12 Japanese nationals in a summit with then-Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and the dramatic return of five nationals in 2002, the abductions issue has been a sticking point in Japan-DPRK relations. Japanese conservative politicians, including members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), complicated the issue by openly exacerbating tensions and calling for a hardline stance against the DPRK, making it extremely difficult for Japanese government leaders to compromise. The resulting public outcry made it impossible for liberal opposition politicians to openly comment on how certain LDP politicians had manipulated the issue for electoral gains, for fear of a backlash. . Negotiations were further hampered by North Korea’s insistence that the kidnapping cases were already “settled.”

Resolving the abductees issue is a very high priority for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, both personally and politically. In 2002, as the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Abe was one of the “hardliners” who advised Koizumi to not return the five abducted Japanese to North Korea, thereby breaching the terms of the agreement with Kim.. In 2003, Abe made a campaign pledge to pressure North Korea to return any surviving abductees and give a complete accounting of all Japanese nationals taken by North Korea. When he replaced Koizumi in 2006, The New York Times went as far as to attribute his “[rise] from obscurity” to his “championing this one cause.” Soon after, Abe declared that the resolution of the abduction issue was “the most important problem our country faces” and established the Headquarters on the Abduction Issue.

However, after his fall from grace in 2007, Abe has returned more pragmatic than before, largely due to the fact that the Japanese people who support him now do so for his economic policies – not his defense policies. If Abe is perceived by the public as too nationalistic or too hawkish, needlessly pushing North Korea to the brink, he risks losing that ever-elusive public mandate. Again. Aware of this change in his power base, Abe appears to be handling the issue more sensibly this time. Sebastian Maslow, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo, comments, “In stark contrast to recent years, the [abductees’] lobby is now being treated with caution, to the extent that they are not included in immediate decision-making, thus allowing for policy options that include dialogue.” Such lobby groups include the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea and the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea. Abe has also succeeded in bringing on board Megumi Yokota’s family with his engagement approach, neutralizing the potent force of this “poster child” from disrupting any bilateral progress. Megumi Yokota is the first known Japanese abductee, abducted in 1977 when she was thirteen years old, off the coast of Niigata Prefecture.

While the focus of public attention has shifted somewhat towards economic concerns, it is also very important to not underestimate the enduring nature of Japanese suspicions towards North Korea. 57% of respondents in a recent Nikkei survey support stronger pressure on North Korea following the delay in the first report. Significantly, this figure is about the same amongst people who approve of Abe’s cabinet and those who disapprove, as well as between LDP supporters and non-affiliates. This clearly demonstrates that the issue is non-partisan and one that has resonance with a wide segment of the Japanese population. Family members of abductees have been particularly vocal in expressing their outrage at what they perceive as North Korea’s “bad faith” in negotiations. In the Nikkei survey, 30% of respondents thought Japan should take a wait-and-see approach.

While Japan’s focus on resolving the abductions issue is understandable – it is after all the sovereign duty of a state to protect its citizens  – Japan’s willingness to negotiate bilaterally with the DPRK may have caused some friction in Japan’s relationship with South Korea and the US, since this essentially undercuts the latter two’s attempts to diplomatically isolate the DPRK. (That being said, the reverse has also happened - at times, Japan’s desire to punish North Korea has undercut South Korea and the US’s efforts to engage with the regime.) As early as May, South Korea cautioned Japan against behaving in any way that could compromise a comprehensive solution on the nuclear issue. Therefore, it is a very positive sign that Cho Tae-Yong, South Korea’s First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed “understanding and cooperation’ for Japanese efforts this past Wednesday. The US has expressed support for Japan as well, but has asked Japan to continue to be transparent in its negotiations with North Korea.