North Korean Purges Continue

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported this past week that North Korea has continued to execute members of its own government. Although yet unverified, 10 officials were recently purged for various crimes such as taking bribes and watching South Korean dramas, bringing the estimated total of officials killed this year to 50. The purges began following DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s execution of his own uncle Jang Song-thaek in December 2013, even though Jang had been one of the most prominent members of the North Korean government since Kim Jong-il, father of the current leader, came to power in 1994. When Kim fell too ill to actively lead the government and the country, Jang was reportedly the one who took charge until he passed away, and even continued supporting the younger Kim during the leadership transition period. Observers had regarded Jang’s position as secure and more or less infallible.

It therefore came as a shock when the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the official state-owned media outlet in North Korea, announced last December that Jang had been accused of attempting to overthrow the government and subsequently executed as a result of these charges. Besides being a show of power, the ensuing purges were also viewed as an attempt to control growing political instability and suppress possible dissent within Kim’s administration. North Korea has had issues controlling the inflow of foreign goods through the black market, and attempted to rid its government of those who were caught with any kind of foreign influence deemed undesirable (particularly information). While this has obvious implications for political instability within the administration, Kim is also concerned about destabilizing foreign information that could also potentially threaten the control the state exerts over the people.

The unprecedented scale of these purges suggests that the Supreme Leader might be feeling increasingly threatened by his own administration in the past months. Jang is not the only victim - other members of his extended family have disappeared - and Kim has also recalled North Korea’s ambassadors to Sweden and Malaysia because they were known to have close ties to Jang. Indeed, the ambassador to Malaysia was Jang’s nephew and the ambassador to Sweden was a “close aide” of Jang’s. These high-profile incidents, coupled with Kim’s disappearance from the public eye for more than one month, have fueled wild rumors of impending large-scale instability and change in North Korea. Kim himself seems somewhat frailer and weaker; it is now widely believed that his absence was caused by a surgery to remove cysts from his ankles and subsequent prolonged recovery period. It therefore makes sense that Kim would seek to adopt the tactics his father and grandfather and initiate purges every now and then, both to tighten his inner circle and to send a public message that nobody in his government is safe and that his power is unmatched. Indeed, the executions have been public, adding credibility to Kim’s commitment that he is willing to be as violent as necessary in order to maintain control.

On a related note, the government has also been struggling to control the infiltration of foreign goods into North Korea through the black market. Indeed, there are more foreign goods in the country than there ever were, a consequence of globalization that even the strictest security regime in the world has trouble resisting. Of the government officials purged this week, 10 of them were reportedly executed because they had been caught watching South Korean soap operas, forbidden in North Korea. It may seem like a trivial misdemeanor to the casual observer, but this belies the premium that the regime places on having a monopoly on information. Knowledge of the outside world is dangerous, particularly since it could reveal just how stark the differences are between North Korea and its southern neighbor. Indeed, the penetration of foreign information goods pervades the country (mostly Pyongyang) at all levels; foreign television shows and music are smuggled into the country in USB keys and DVDs, and goods are often purchased by the wider North Korean population using American dollars, real or counterfeit. A North Korean defector who used to be a government official says that the infiltration of foreign culture into the lives of the North Korean population is the “greatest thorn in the regime’s side.”

The upshot of these purges is that there are still major tensions within the North Korean government. While some might take this as a given in any authoritarian regime, it shows that Kim Jong-un, even two years on, still has yet to fully consolidate his control. The adage “perception is reality” has rarely been more accurate: the extreme violence of these purges shows not that Kim’s control is increasing but in fact just the opposite, and reflect paranoia more than anything else.